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Abstract
This article contributes to the debate of the meaning of relationalism and background independence, which has re-
mained of interest in theoretical physics from Newton versus Leibniz through to foundational issues for today’s leading
candidate theories of quantum gravity. I contrast and compose the substantially different Leibniz–Mach–Barbour (LMB)
and Rovelli–Crane (RC) uses of the word ‘relational’. Leibniz advocated primary timelessness and Mach that ‘time is
to be abstracted from change’. I consider 3 distinct viewpoints on Machian time: Barbour’s, Rovelli’s and my own. I
provide four expansions on Barbour’s taking configuration space to be primary: to (perhaps a weakened notion of) phase
space, categorizing, perspecting and propositioning. Categorizing means considering not only object spaces but also the
corresponding morphisms and then functors between such pairs. Perspecting means considering the set of subsystem per-
spectives; this is an arena in which the LMB and Rovelli approaches make contact. By propositioning, I mean considering
the set of propositions about a physical (sub)system. I argue against categorization being more than a formal pre-requisite
for quantization in general; however, perspecting is a categorical operation, and propositioning leads one to considering
topoi, with Isham and Doering’s work represents one possibility for a mathematically sharp implementation of proposi-
tioning. Further applications of this article are arguing for Ashtekar variables as being relational in LMB as well as just
the usually-ascribed RC sense, relationalism versus supersymmetry, string theory and M-theory. The question of whether
scale is relational is also considered, with quantum cosmology in mind.
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1 Introduction
This article concerns relationalism. This word is used very differently by Barbour (and various collaborators) and I [15, 22,
34, 46, 51, 55, 87] on the one hand, and by Crane [102, 103] and Rovelli [104, 109] (with subsequent use in Loop Quantum
Gravity (‘LQG’) [106, 109, 192, 113, 116, 114, 117]) on the other hand. This article is mostly about the former (a successor
to/considerable extension of [15, 22, 34]), though it does contrast, and to some extent compose, this with the latter. Moreover,
the position developed here most ly lies between Barbour’s [22, 64] and Rovelli’s [109, 114] extremes regarding the fine detail
of the Machian notion of time as being abstracted from change. As regards other recent reviews, Pooley’s [91] is a 3-way
comparison of which three Barbour’s alone features in this review (I go for the approaches that enter Quantum Gravity
programs, whereas Pooley goes for the past 2 decades’ philosophizing). Barbour’s article [78] and Gryb’s Thesis [92] largely
only cover Barbour’s approach.
In Sec 2, I sketch the history of the absolute versus relational motion debate, which remains an active source of contention
between a number of different approaches to the unsolved problem of Quantum Gravity (‘QG’) today. In fact, I consider
QG to stand for Quantum Gestalt, a term that I coin in recognition of GR being not only a relativistic theory of gravitation
but also, following Einstein, a freeing of physics from absolute/background structure; the expression ‘Quantum Gravity’
fails to capture the latter. Thus I am taking ‘Quantum Gestalt’ to be shorthand for Quantum Theory of the Relativistic
Gravity–Background Independence Gestalt. Certainly most LQG practitioners agree that what they are studying is also
intended as a Quantum Theory of Background Independence; this is also to be understood of some approaches to M-theory
(but not of perturbative String Theory). [As to other names, ‘Quantum GR’ will not do in this role since it implies the
specific Einstein field equations, whereas Quantum Gestalt remains open-minded as to which relativistic theory of gravitation
is involved; this distinction parallels that between ‘Quantum GR’ and ‘Quantum Gravity’. Quantum Gestalt is also in
contradistinction with ‘Background Independent Quantum Gravity’ since the latter carries connotations of the background
independent and gravitational parts being split, whereas in the former they are held to be joint. Finally, much as one can
model Quantum Gravity without background independence (at least for some purposes), one can likewise model Quantum
Background Independence without relativistic gravitation; from the Quantum Gestalt perspective, these two ventures are
complements, suggesting that one may learn considerably from the latter as well as from the former. Relational Particle
Mechanics (RPM) [15, 38, 55], once quantized [87], is such a theory of Quantum Background Independence without relativistic
gravitation.] Sec 2 also suggests some simple informal interpretations that might be taken to underlay some of the Leibniz-
and Mach-type ideas that are themselves presented in subsequent sections.
In Sec 3, I consider configuration space q and Barbour’s ascribing primality to it in his relational program [15, 23, 34, 38,
44, 46, 64, 78]. Whilst Leibniz [1] argued for time not to be primary, Mach [3] argued for time to be an emergent concept, more
specifically that ‘time is to be abstracted from change’. This program’s subsequent build-up (see also [22, 57, 87]) of actions
that are temporally relational (Leibnizian) and configurationally relational with respect to some group g of transformations
that are held to be unphysical, is reviewed and generalized in Secs 4 to 8. This includes using Jacobi–Synge [153, 150] type
actions, dispensing with velocity as a primary notion and recasting the canonical definition of momenta accordingly, as well as
using Barbour and Bertotti’s [15] indirect implementation of configurational relationalism and the Jacobi–Barbour–Bertotti
realization of a Machian emergent time. Sec 8 discusses the alternative direct implementation [55, 87] of configurational
relationalism that is occasionally available. Sec 9 provides a number of examples, including 1- and 2-d RPM’s for which the
direct implementation is available [55, 69, 87]. It also covers how, whilst GR is usually formulated in a spacetime way that
does not directly implement Mach’s ideas as understood in the relational program, can nevertheless be cast in a manifestly
relational form [34, 37, 51, 56, 57] that is quite akin to geometrodynamics, and even more akin to the Baierlein–Sharp–
Wheeler [6] and Christodoulou Chronos Principle [12, 13] formalisms. Moreover, whilst this LMB (Leibniz–Mach–Barbour)
program’s literature usually uses this more traditional dynamical formulation of GR, I lay out how the Ashtekar variables
approach is also LMB-relational. I also provide some comments on relationalism versus supersymmetry (see [96] for more),
String Theory and M-Theory. As such, I make contact between LMB relationalism and much of modern Theoretical Physics.
Given these examples, I am in a position to comment further on compatibility restrictions between the q’s and the g’s in
Sec 10.
I then consider four expansions of Barbour’s ‘q is primary’ postulate: to (perhaps weakened) phase space in Sec 11,
to categorization in Sec 12, to propositioning in Sec 13 and to ‘perspectivalism’ in Sec 14. Categorizing means considering
not only object spaces but also the corresponding morphisms and then functors between such pairs. Perspecting means
considering the set of subsystem perspectives; this is an arena in which the LMB and RC approaches make contact. By
propositioning, I mean considering the set of propositions about a physical (sub)system; this makes contact with ideas of
Isham, Doering and Butterfield [179, 193, 194, 195] concerning applying Topos Theory to Quantum Theory). Perspecting
makes substantial contact with the other main line of work termed ‘relational’ in the Quantum Gravity literature, i.e. Rovelli
and Crane’s works. In Sec 15 I consider a substantial generalization of Barbour’s ‘best matching’ indirect implementation of
configurational relationalism, that also happens to generalize the mathematically well-known notion of group-averaging.
I next consider the corresponding situation at the quantum level in Secs 16 to 21. This is entwined with a number of
facets of the notorious Problem of Time and of relevance as regards selection of strategies to attempt to resolve this. Sec 16
covers temporal and configurational relationalism within a quantum scheme along the lines of Isham 1984 [162]. I include
analysis of the Problem of Time facets and strategies in accord to the extent to which their attitude to time is Leibniz–Mach.
I illustrate this with examples in Sec 17. I then consider q primality at the quantum level in Sec 18, provide arguments
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against considering quantization in general as a functor in Sec 19, and discuss QM perspectivalism in Sec 20 with Rovelli
and Crane inputs and QM propositioning in Sec 21 with contact with Isham and Doering’s work.
My Conclusion (Sec 22) covers the presently-known principal applications of the current article. 1) Pointers relating
Machian time interpretations to the formulations of timeless approaches [94], 2) other Problem of Time applications, 3) the
issue of whether scale should be among the concepts discarded by relationalism (which argument is tied to the semiclassical
approach to Quantum Cosmology). 4) This article comments on the foundations of, and relational notions applicable in,
Ashtekar variables/LQG. 5) It also suggests contention between Relationalism and Supersymmetry [96]. 6) Finally, I outline
various possibilities for unifying Isham–Doering propositioning with each of Rovelli–Crane perspecting and Records Theory.
2 Some informalities
2.1 Historical background: absolute or relational motion debate
This debate has been around since the inception of Newtonian Mechanics.1 In outline, Newton’s [121] traditional formulation
of mechanics defined ‘true’ motion to be relative to an absolute space that is all-pervasive, infinite, invisible and can not
be acted upon. Newton also considered motion to occur in time. His notion of time was additionally an absolute one. I.e.,
external, continuous, and uniformly flowing as ‘needed to transform kinematic geometry into physical dynamics’ [18]. (In
fact, much of this conception of time was not new to Newton, c.f. Barrow [120], Gassendi [119] and even Ptolemy [118].) The
virtue of Newton’s scheme is working well in practise, nature immediately vindicating its practical consequences in detail.
However, Newton’s formulation of mechanics has been argued to be bankrupt from a philosophical perspective. Absolute
space does not comply with Leibniz’s famous identity of indiscernibles [1], by which e.g. our universe and a copy in which
all material objects are collectively displaced by a fixed distance surely share all observable properties and thus are one and
the same. Also, Leibniz already considered time not to be a separate external entity with respect to which things change.
Bishop Berkeley [2] and Mach [3] (see also e.g. [18, 23] for further discussion) added to these arguments, e.g. Mach holding
absolute space to be a non-entity on account of its not being actable upon. The alternative is for mechanics to be relational:
spatial properties are to be entirely about the relations between material objects, and ‘time to be abstracted from change’
(Mach’s notion). Historically, there was a lack in alternative theories with such features, though the comparatively recent
RPM’s of Barbour–Bertotti (1982) and Barbour (2003) that are the subject of this article do now serve as such.
Furthermore, Leibniz, Bishop Berkeley and Mach’s arguments are philosophically compelling enough that they ought to
apply to not just mechanics but to physics as a whole. As argued in Sec 9, GR is also relational, and indeed relationalism
is one foundation from which GR can be derived, for all that this was not the historical route to GR. For, while Einstein
was interested in ‘Machian issues’, the way in which he viewed these does not coincide with the Barbour-relational view
[7, 18, 34], nor did Einstein’s historical route to GR [4, 21] constitute a direct implementation of Machian ideas (see Sec 9).
See e.g. [17, 23, 30, 26, 27, 25, 31, 32, 33, 19, 24, 42] as regards arguments for (and against) the value of Barbour and
Bertotti’s 1982 theory toward the absolute or relative motion debate. Relationalism would appear to have a good case for
use in whole-universe situations, both from a philosophical perspective and because GR and at least some further GR-like
theories do implement it. (These are good theories for whole-universe situations on a number of further grounds.)
2.2 Underlaying of relational principles
Some intuitive if vague underlying relational principles are as follows.
Relationalism 0) Relational physics is to be solely about the relations between tangible entities
This is taken to be the universalization of Sec 2.1’s statement of relationalism for mechanics to all physics.
I use ‘tangible entities’ in place of ‘material objects’ to make it clear that this is open to fields and ‘force mediators’ as
well as ‘matter building blocks’, as befits modern physics. The key properties of tangible entities are, rather, as follows.
Relationalism 1) [Mach] These act testably and are actable upon.
Relationalism 2) [Leibniz] Any such which are indiscernible are held to be identical.
Note 1) That which is not testably acting or actable upon is held to be, rather, a non-entity. [This is still held to be a type of
entity as regards being able to philosophize about it or mathematically represent it, just not a physical entity; absolute space
is an obvious archetypal example.] This is less vague than saying ‘things’, which could be merely mathematical in nature.
Note 2) As regards Relationalism 2), in physics, relationalism posits that physical indiscernibility must trump multiplicity
of mathematical representation; this multiplicity still exists mathematically, but the true mathematics corresponding to the
physics in question is the equivalence class spanning that multiplicity. A range of attitudes to the identity of indiscernibles and
1I use ‘relational’ here rather than ‘relative’ here to avoid confusion with Einstein’s relativity, which also features prominently in the present
article. Philosophers of physics have also taken to using ‘substantival’ instead of ‘absolute’.
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alternatives to it are considered by Butterfield and Caulton [80] One would then only wish to attribute physical significance
to computations of tangible entities which succeed in being independent of the choice of representative of the equivalence
class; the archetype of this is Gauge Theory. Chapter 2 of [87] also argues that dimension is partly undefined for a universe
consisting of a sufficiently small number of particles. An important lesson from there is that a set of part-tangible and
part-non entities is often altogether more straightforward to represent mathematically.
Note 3) In this article’s main sense of relational, one treats instantaneous configurations and time separately as befits the
great conceptual heterogeneity between them.
Note 4) One largely accepts that the mathematics will be in general be most straightforward for mixtures of part-tangible-
and part-non-entities.
Note 5) I do not take this SSec’s principles too seriously; it is the standard use of configuration space, and Relationalism 4–6)
and 8), perhaps supplemented by Relationalism 3) and 7), that are the actually mathematically-implemented starting point
of the LMB approach (and variants). As such, Relationalism 0–2) for now being vague or loose relative to Relationalism 3)
to 8) is not a problem for the work actually done in this article, but only for this present SSec, which represents a tentative
underlaying rather than a rigorous foundational underlying.
3 Configuration space
As regards the instantaneous configuration entities of a given theory, which I denote by QC, a key further concept is the
configuration space q, i.e. the space of all the possible instantaneous configurations (each of the points in configuration space
represents one state of the instantaneous configuration, i.e. a set of one value per QC).
Example 1) Particle positions are configurations; see [153] for a clear exposition of the configuration space notion for these.
Example 2) The more reduced inter-particle relative separations or relative cluster separations (see Sec 9.1) are configurations.
Example 3) Sec 9.2 covers even more reduced relational mechanics configurations.
Example 4) The values at each point of continuous extended objects, whether fields or geometrical objects that have values
everywhere in space, which include both the 3-metrics (or the more reduced 3-geometries) of GR (see Sec 9.4) and objects
that have their own separate notion of space (NOS) of extent such as strings or membranes.
I denote the general NOS by Σp for p ≤ d the dimension of space, and I coordinatize it by xµp . However, in this article all
specific examples of this are for p = d (field theories), in which case I drop the p subscripts, or for p = 0, in which case Σ0
is just a point corresponding to the particle position, which point ceases to possess any internal coordinatization. I denote
integration over whatever NOS is appropriate by
∫
Σp
dΣp. I take this to collapse to a multiplicative 1 for particle mechanics
and other finite theories. I denote finite theory cases’ instantaneous configurations by QC. For field theory cases, I denote
the instantaneous configurations by QC(xµ). Thus the typeface object QC is a portmanteau of the upright space-dependent
case for field theories and the slanty case for finite theories. That is the default notation in this article as regards typeface,
straight and slanty symbols. Such portmanteaux serve as a shorthand covering both cases at once to encompass both this
article’s RPM models and the geometrodynamical formulation of GR that they are closely analogous to. The C in use above
is a suitable multi-index, over particle and/or continuous extended object species.2
N.B. configuration space is generally not just a set, being, rather, further equipped with topological space, metric space
and geometrical structure. A broad example of the last of these is Finsler metric geometry q = 〈s,F〉 for s a topological
manifold and F the metric function.3 (Semi-)Riemannian geometry is then a common subcase of this which is usually written
in terms of the metric MAB itself: q = 〈s,M〉. Some of the relational program’s examples are in fact infinite-dimensional
generalizations of such geometries. (But I still refer to such by the usual finite-dimensional geometries’ names, i.e. I elevate
those names to be finite and field-theoretic portmanteaux of the usual finite notions).
Relationalism 3) [Barbour] This concerns the possibility that the configurations are the primary entities. I.e. the
configuration space q has a primary role.
Note 1) Relationalism 3) is technically a not a relationalist postulate but a minimalist one; such go quite often hand in hand
with relational postulates. This does not necessarily mean that relationalists discard structures, but rather that they are
prepared to consider the outcome of doing so. Some relational ideas are a subset of minimalism, e.g. doubting and discarding
absolute space and absolute time. See also Secs 10 and 16 as regards whether scale is to be discarded from physics, Secs 2
and 9 as regards relationalists’ questioning of Minkowski’s view on spacetime and its subsequent primacy over how GR is
conceived of. [I.e. arguing that the dynamical tradition favours the primality of space, and that this, despite amounting to
supposing less structure, nevertheless turns out to serve as an alternative foundation for GR.]
2I use PbQAc as the portmanteau for P (QA) for finite theories and P(xµp ; QA] for infinite theories, where round brackets indicate function
dependence, square brackets indicate functional dependence and ( ; ] is mixed function-functional dependence, with the former prior to the semi-
colon and the latter after it. I use braces for actual brackets. I then use a special font (Large mathfrak) for such portmanteaux that come integrated
over their corresponding notion of space (the action S is a such); these are therefore pure functionals in terms of what they depend on, but differ
in the portmanteau way in terms of what features on the computational side of the equation.
3I generally use 〈 〉 to denote ‘space of’. I use lower-case Greek indices for spatial indices 1 to d. I use bold font as shorthand for configuration
space indices and underline for spatial indices.
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4 Building relational actions and then using the Principles of Dynamics
Relationalism 4) [Barbour] One aims to build up relational actions from natural compound objects derived from the QC.
Note 1) In making use of actions, we are working with, and drawing upon, the Principles of Dynamics. Many of the steps
below follow from this as natural consequences of having an action, rather than of relationalism per se. But the particular
actions used embody relationalism, and the some of the subsequent Principles of Dynamics workings assist in enforcing that.
This valuing and making specific use of the Principles of Dynamics differs from Mach’s own thinking; it is due to Barbour
and concerns positing that relational actions are the most fundamental starting-point for (classical) whole-universe physics.
Note 2) This is a mathematical structural composition postulate; it is relational only in that the primary objects themselves
are to be taken to be relational.
Note 3) The compound objects readily include NOS derivatives (whenever the NOS is nontrivial) and contracted objects.
From what the reader knows about actions, one might expect velocities to be required too, and these involve an incipient
notion of time, so we need to discuss that next before making progress with the construction of actions. Moreover, the
manner of that progress may well be unexpected to the reader. In particular, actions conventionally involve velocities.
5 Temporal relationalism and actions implementing it
5.1 Temporal relationalism
Relationalism 5) [Leibniz] A physical theory is temporally relational if there is no meaningful primary notion of time
for the system as a whole (e.g. the universe) [15, 34, 55].
This is implemented by
1) manifest parametrization irrelevance, alongside
2) freedom from extraneous time-related variables, such as external absolute Newtonian time or GR’s ‘lapse’ variable,
at the level of the action principle.
5.2 A preliminary, more conventional view on constructing temporally relational actions
Perhaps the reader is objecting that the preceding SSec does not help with obtaining a notion of velocity since it denies
rather than provides a primary notion of time for the system as a whole. A simple way of getting round this is to point out
that MPI actions are trivially equivalent to actions that are
1′) manifestly reparametrization-invariant (MRI).
[For MRI, any choice of (monotonic) parameter will do, so that choice is empty, and any such choice is equivalent to making
no choice by not parametrizing i.e. using the MPI action.] Next, MRI has a parameter λ, so that, for all that it is a non-entity,
one can interpret it as a label time non-entity, and write down
velocity := d(configuration variable)/d(label time) i.e. dQA/dλ . (1)
One can then straightforwardly build the kinetic term T := ||◦Q||M2/2 = MAB◦QAQB/2. I am assuming for now that this takes
the most physically standard form that is homogeneous quadratic in the velocities; I lift this assumption later on in this SSec.
MAB is the configuration space metric portmanteau of MAB(Q
C) for finite theories and MAB(Q
C(xµ)) for infinite theories (this
is assuming ultralocality, i.e. no derivative dependence, collapsing the object from a functional to a mere function, which
mathematical simplicity holds over the entirety of the standardly accepted fundamental theories of physics). Its determinant
is M and its inverse is NAB. || ||M denotes the corresponding M-‘norm’. ◦ := D/Dλ, the portmanteau of d/dλ in the finite
case and ∂/∂λ in the field-theoretic case.4 One can then form the Lagrangian portmanteau, LbQ˙A, QAc of the Lagrangian
L(QA, Q˙A) and the ultralocal Lagrangian density L(Q˙
A
; QA) for field theories, and thus, integrating over λ and the NOS,
the relational action. Compliance with MRI does make the Lagrangian portmanteau in question look somewhat unusual,
i.e. not be of difference-type form L = T − V, but rather of product form L = 2√TW. For now we take on trust that this
W = E+U for U = −V, where V is the potential energy portmanteau: potential V (QA) for finite theories and potential density
V(xµ; QA(xµ)] for field theories. Thus it is assumed to be A) independent of the velocities [this is another mathematical
simplicity that happens to be in accord with the standardly-accepted fundamental physics]. B) time-independent [which
makes good sense for fundamental whole-universe setting as opposed to the setting for dissipative subsystems or approximate
4This is intended as type of ‘dot symbol’; I often use large preceding derivative symbols rather than overhead derivative symbols for graphical
ease of accommodation of the subtleties of configurational relationalism by hanging suffixes on the large-symbol versions. I use δ/δ for functional
derivatives, D/D as ordinary, partial derivative portmanteau, ∇/∇ as partial, functional derivative portmanteau, D/D as ordinary, functional
derivative portmanteau. I hang ‘cov’, ‘abs’ suffices on these for covariant and absolute derivatives, using D for ∂ and D for δ in these contexts.
Finally, I use 4 for Laplacians (suitably suffixed to say of which type), D for measures and oversized δ for variations.
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modelling e.g. involving friction]. This time-independence of the potential, alongside time-independence of the kinetic metric
is part of what is covered by the ‘no extraneous time-like objects’ part of the given mathematical implementation of temporal
relationalism. E is the energy-like portmanteau: total energy E for finite theories and some kind of total energy density
for field theories (‘density’ here includes a Jacobian factor). [U and W are, for now, just to be considered as the notational
tidyings defined above; we will justify this trust in Sec 5.11.] The MRI relational action is thus
sMRIJ =
∫
dλ
∫
Σp
dΣpL
MRI
J = 2
∫
dλ
∫
Σp
dΣp
√
TW , (2)
where the J stands for ‘Jacobi’ since the finite case of this is Jacobi’s principle.
5.3 Relational dethroning of velocity as a primary notion
A more manifestly relational manoeuvre, however, is to acknowledge that if there is no meaningful notion of time, then
conventional physics’ definition of velocity,
velocity := d(configuration variable)/d(some notion of time) , (3)
reads that there is consequently no meaningful primary notion of velocity! Subsequently, nothing defined in terms of velocities
such as kinetic terms, Lagrangians or canonical momenta, is guaranteed to meaningfully exist either. What does have tangible
physical content, however, are the
d(configuration variable) i.e. the dQA (4)
themselves, so that velocities are replaced by differentials of the configuration variables. I.e., changes in time are meaningless
in relational physics, the tangible content resides, rather, among the changes of one configuration variable with respect to
another,
d(configuration variable 1)/d(configuration variable 2) i.e. dQ1/dQ2 . (5)
5.4 The subsequent relational view on constructing temporally relational actions
As a follow-up of this dethroning of velocity from the realm of relational physics, the usual homogeneous quadratic kinetic term
is supplanted by ds2/2 for (kinetic arc element)2 := ds2 := ||dQ||M2 = MABdQAdQB. I note that this is a purely geometrical
quantity. The action is, in complete generality, to be homogeneous linear in the d(configuration variable) so as to comply
with MPI/MRI; in the homogeneous quadratic case this amounts to taking the square root. Then expression under the
action’s integral in the MPI action is of the form d˜s, where the tilde indicates a rescaling by some weight that is homogeneous
of degree zero in the dQ. [This is usually taken to be independent of the weights so as to match the conventional approach
to fundamental physics having velocity-independent potential.] I use (physical arc element) := d˜s := 2
√
Wds = 2
√
W||dQ||M
and then the action is
sMPIJ :=
∫ ∫
Σp
dΣpd˜s . (6)
Such assembly of an action may be subject to some limitations, whether from implementing physical or philosophical
principles (see e.g. Sec 7), or from purely mathematical simplicity postulates such as ‘no derivatives higher than first (or, in
a few special cases, that include GR, second)’. The above particular action coming from the homogeneous quadratic physics
only assumption is of Jacobi type. In the case of mechanics itself, the NOS integration collapses to 1 and the above is precisely
the Jacobi action principle, which is well-known and established to be cleaner in a number of ways than Euler–Lagrange’s
(alongside having a number of relational whole-universe features and applications). In parallel to the Lagrangian portmanteau,
ds and d˜s are in fact portmanteaux of arclength elements in the finite case and nontrivially Riemannian elements (no signature
restriction implied) in the field-theoretic case. The MPI formulation does not have a primary concept of Lagrangian - it has
the arc element instead. In other words, it is a ‘geodesic principle’ i.e. a variational principle that takes the mathematical
form of finding the geodesic corresponding to a Riemannian (or sometimes more general) geometry. By the above, and how
the integrand being a product and not a difference like the conventional Lagrangian does not unacceptedly alter the physics
resulting from the action, are explained below.
The MRI or MPI action of the above form for homogeneous quadratic T or ds2 physics is the Jacobi-type action principle;
in the finite case of mechanics, it is the Jacobi action principle itself. This is more commonly encountered in the MRI form,
though I note that Jacobi himself did use the MPI geodesic principle form.
5.5 More general temporally relational actions
sMPIJS =
∫ ∫
Σp
dΣpd˜s =
∫ ∫
Σp
dΣpdλL = sMRIJS (7)
complies with temporal relationalism, and has mutual compatibility, by L
⌊
DQ
Dλ , Q
⌋
dλ = ds˜dλdλ = d˜s =
ds
dµdµ = L
⌊
DQ
Dµ , Q,
⌋
dµ.
[This uses Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions, and takes λ and µ to be any two monotonically-related parameters;
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also, by this equivalence, I henceforth drop MPI and MRI labels.] The ‘square root of homogeneous quadratic’ Jacobi-type
case is then an obvious subcase of this. Moreover, the above generalization includes passage from Riemannian geometry (no
signature connotation intended) to Finsler geometry (no nondegeneracy connotation intended; L is cast in the role of metric
function F). It is still a geodesic principle, just for a more complicated notion of geometry. In fact, the Jacobi-type action
more commonly arises in the literature (see e.g. [52, 153]) not from the desire to be relational but rather from the desire to
provide the natural mechanics for a given geometry. Synge’s work starting with [150] generalized this to the more general
geometry above [153]. The geometry in question enters by playing the role of configuration space geometry. In their honour,
I denote the geometrically-natural construction of a mechanics given a metric geometry by JS : 〈s,F〉 −→ sMPIJS .
5.6 Temporally relational formulation of the notion of conjugate momentum
The standard definition of conjugate momentum is PA := ∇L/∇Q˙ . Then computing this from the MRI form of the Jacobi
action gives PA =
√
W/TMAB◦QA . However, manifest relationalism has been argued to have no place for velocities or La-
grangians, so either the above definition of momentum, or the conceptual role played by momentum, need to be reformulated.
In this case, it turns out that the notion of conjugate momentum itself survives, by there being an equivalent manifestly-
relational form for the defining formula, PA := ∇d˜s/∇dQA . Then computing this gives PA =
√
2WMABdQ
B/||dQ||M , which is
manifestly within the span of notion (5).
5.7 Outline of the Dirac method
Next, one inspects to see if there are any inter-relations among these momenta due to the form of the action: primary
constraints [8]. Then variation of the action with respect to the base objects provides some evolution equations and perhaps
some secondary constraints [8]. One then finds the evolution equations. Finally, one checks whether even more constraints
may arise by the requirement that the evolution equations propagate the constraints; this is best done at the level of Poisson
brackets (or Dirac brackets if required by the presence of so-called second-class constraints).
5.8 Quadratic constraint: momenta as ‘direction cosines’
The MRI implementation of temporal relationalism leads to constraints via the following general argument of Dirac [8] (as
straightforwardly modified by me to concern differentials rather than velocities, and MPI instead of MRI actions). Since MPI
actions are homogeneous of degree 1 in the differentials, the k momenta arising from these are homogeneous of degree 0 in
the differentials. Hence the momenta are functions of at most k − 1 independent ratios of differentials. Thus the momenta
must have at least 1 relation between them (which is by definition a primary constraint).
Moreover, for the above Jacobi-type action, there is precisely one such constraint (per relevant NOS point). This is due to
A) the square-root form of the action, by which the momenta are much like direction cosines and ‘their squaring to 1’ property
by which they are not all independent. Here, instead, these square (using the M matrix) to 2W. Thus, the kinetic term in
terms of momenta (a legitimately relational object since the momenta are), which is half of the above square, is equal to W.
B) in cases with nontrivial space of extent, due to the particular local ordering of having the square root (and sum over A,
B implicit in the kinetic arc element or kinetic term) inside the integral-over-space-of-extent sign as opposed to outside it.
All-in-all, one has an energy-type constraint which is quadratic and not linear in the momenta,
Quad := NABPAPB/2 + W = 0 . (8)
5.9 Evolution equations
Again, the usual form of the evolution equations makes reference to Lagrangians, times and velocities:
D
Dλ
{
∇dL
∇Q˙A
}
=
∇dL
∇QA . (9)
There is however a manifestly relational version of this available, d{∇d˜s/∇dQA} = ∇d˜s/∇QA.
I.e. expanding,
√
2W
||dQ||M d
{ √
2W
||dQ||M dQ
A
}
+ΓABC
√
2W
||dQ||M dQ
B
√
2W
||dQ||M dQ
C = NAB
∇W
∇QB ,
(10)
where ΓABC are the configuration space Christoffel symbols.
5.10 Emergent Jacobi time
Both the conjugate momenta and the evolution equations are simplified if one uses
∗ := D
Dtem(J)
:=
√
W
T
◦ := 1
N
◦ := 1
I˙
◦ = D
DI
. (11)
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Here, tem(J) is to be interpreted as an emergent time, the portmanteau of position-independent time t for finite systems and
position-dependent time t(xµ) for infinite systems; I term it the Jacobi emergent time. It, and modifications of it, have
long appeared in Barbour’s work (e.g. [15, 22]). Though I have also seen it in earlier Russian literature [5] for mechanics,
and as Christodoulou’s Chronos Principle [12] for GR, so I leave open the question of who its first proponent was.
Inverting so as to obtain an expression for the emergent Jacobi time itself,
tem(J) − tem(J)(0) =
∫
||dQ||M/
√
2W . (12)
This implements
Relationalism 6) [Mach] Time is to be abstracted from change:
tMach = F [dQ] . (13)
Relationalism 7) [Leibniz–Barbour] THE MOST PERFECT time is to be abstracted from THE TOTALITY OF
change (my phrasing, and which is implemented here via all of the Q are involved via the W and the dQ):
tLMB = F [all dQ] . (14)
I refer to Relationalism 6, 7) together as the LMB view of time.
In (11), the first step defines a shorthand, the second is the MRI computational formula: the third relates the lapse N to it,
the fourth recasts lapse as a truer velocity of the instant notion I˙ [57]. The fifth recasts this as the even truer differential of
the instant notion [87] dI, by which the instant I itself is identified with the emergent time tem(J) that labels that instant.
The above generalized lapse notion N is a portmanteau of N for finite theories and N(xµ) for field theories. Similarly,
the above generalized instant notion I is a portmanteau of I for finite theories and I(xµ) for field theories. The momenta
in terms of ∗ are then just PA = MAB∗QB, while the evolution equations are Dabs2QA = ∗∗QA + ΓABC∗QB∗QC = ∇W/∇QA.
Note that this is but a parageodesic equation with respect to the kinetic metric (meaning it has a forcing term arising
from the W), but is clearly going to be a true geodesic equation with respect to the physical (tilded) metric.
Of use in practical computations, one can supplant one of the evolution equations (finite case) or one per space point
(infinite case) with the Lagrangian form of the quadratic ‘energy-type’ constraint,
MAB∗QA∗QB/2 + W = 0 . (15)
As first remarked upon in the subcase of mechanics [22], the above reveals tem(J) to be a recovery on relational premises of
the same quantity that is more usually assumed to be the absolute external Newtonian time, tNewton; there is a conceptually-
similar recovery in the general case which covers a further number of well-known notions of time (see Sec 2).
Another form for the parageodesic equation is ∗PA = ∇W/∇QA As tem(J) has been cast as an expression solely in terms of
the QA and dQA,
d(configuration variable/d(emergent Jacobi time) = dQA/dtem(J) (16)
do have tangible physical content, through being a type of (3) and not of (5). Thus in the relational approach the above
equations entirely make sense from a temporally relational perspective, unlike in the absolute Newtonian counterparts of them
that have the same mathematical form but pin an absolute time interpretation on the times present. The emergent time
is provided by the system. For now, it furthermore gives the appearance of being provided by the whole of the subsystem.
These last two sentences fit Mach’s own conception of time as per Sec 2.1. Also, the usually-assumed notion of time as an
independent variable is un-Leibnizian and un-Machian. However, though it is to be overall abstracted from motion, once this
is done it is a convenient choice for (emergent) independent variable.
We shall from now on work with MPI and MRI forms held to be interchangeable, with preference for writing MPI ones. We
will likewise present specific equations in terms of ∗ in the geodesic/Lagrangian picture (the geodesic picture is in terms of
configuration variables and their differentials in parallel to how the Lagrangian picture is in terms of configuration variables
and their velocities).
5.11 Inter-relating the Jacobi product and Euler–Lagrange difference actions
The more well-known difference alias Euler–Lagrange-type actions are, rather,
sEL =
∫
dt
∫
Σp
dΣpL =
∫
dt
∫
Σp
dΣp{Tt − V} . (17)
Here Tt is the kinetic energy formulated in terms of D/Dt derivatives for t conventionally an external notion of time (absolute
time for mechanics, coordinate time for GR, which is a label time because GR is already-parametrized). See e.g. [153] or
Sec 2 of [87] for how (2) ⇒ (17) in the case of mechanics by Routhian reduction, and [53] or Sec 2 of [87] for (17) ⇒ (2) by
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the emergence of some lapse-like quantity.5 Various advantages for product-type actions over difference-type actions stem
from this as regards consideration of whole-universe fundamental physics, which is the setting for Quantum Cosmology. The
above justifies the identification of W as the combination of well-known physical entities E− V.
6 Configurational relationalism and its indirect implementation
Relationalism 8) [my extension and part-reformulation of Barbour]. The action is to be configurationally relational as
regards a group of transformations if a g-transformed world-configuration is indiscernible from one that is not. I.e., one is
to build into one’s theory that a certain group of transformations g acting upon the theory’s configuration space q are to
be irrelevant, i.e. physically meaningless [15, 34, 47, 51, 55, 57, 69], transformations. More specific detail of the q–g pairing
is postponed until after we have seen details of specific examples, to Sec 10.
One way to implement this is to use not ‘bare’ configurations and their composites as above, but rather their arbitrary-g-
frame-corrected counterparts. This is the only known way that is sufficiently widespread for a relational program to underlie
the whole of the classical fundamental physics status quo of GR coupled to the Standard Model (see Sec 9). The corrections
are with respect to auxiliary variables gZ [a portmanteau of the finite case gZ and the position-dependent case gZ(xµ) in field
theory] that are paired with the infinitesimal generators of g.
Originally the gZ employed were in the form of multiplier coordinate corrections to the velocities
Q˙
A −
∑
Z
→
ggZ Q
A . (18)
Here
−→
g denotes the infinitesimal group action. However, this formulation is not consistent with manifest temporal rela-
tionalism since the multiplier corrections spoil this. Nor is it relational insofar as it is formulated in terms of meaningless
label-time velocities. Nor is it an arbitrary-g frame approach. The next SSec amends these things, and then the rest of the
present SSec applies just as well within this amendment.
The above also seems to be taking a step in the wrong direction as regards g being irrelevant in passing from the already-
frame-redundant q to the principal fibre bundle6 over q, P (q,g). For, from the perspective of just counting degrees of
freedom, this can be locally regarded as the product space q×g, which has more degrees of freedom, as opposed to passing
to the quotient space q/g, which has less. However, we shall also resolve this contention below.
Moreover, the essential line of thought of this SSec is the only known approach to configurational relationalism that is
general enough to cover the Einstein–Standard Model presentation of Physics.7
This SSec’s notion of configurational relationalism is my [47] portmanteau that spans both of the following.
1) Spatial relationalism, as in the traditional mechanics setting and the (geometro)dynamical formulation of GR.
2) Internal relationalism, as in electromagnetism, Yang–Mills Theory and the associated scalar and fermion gauge theories.
This wide range of cases is afforded by correspondingly wide ranges of q and g. (Although adopting a q may carry
connotations of there being some underlying NOS with which that is compatible. Also, given a q, there are consistency
limitations on what variety of g can then have – see Sec 10). For the scaled version of RPM, g is the Euclidean group
of translations and rotations, Eucl(d), while for pure-shape version it is the similarity group of translations, rotations and
dilations, Sim(d).
This extension and partial reformulation of Barbour’s spatial relationalism shows that it and the conventional notion of
Gauge Theory (usually internal but also applicable to spatial concepts) bear a very close relation. Following on from Note 3
of Sec 2, Gauge Theory is indeed Leibnizian and indeed an example of how such can usually only be implemented indirectly
by mathematics of a mixed set of tangible entities and non-entities (respectively true dynamical degrees of freedom and gauge
degrees of freedom). Configurational relationalism is generalized in Sec 15.
Finally, I here propose to extend the meaning of configurational relationalism to have a second clause: ‘no extraneous
space structures’. This matches temporal relationalism’s second clause of no extraneous time variables, and also serves
to exclude the Nambu–Goto string action (which, without this extra criterion, can indeed be included under the previous
literature’s formulation of relationalism). For such reasons [186, 179, 182, 188, 170, 172, 176, 187, 183, 127, 43, 8], theories
in fixed-
5Such mathematics conventionally appears in the mechanics literature under the name of the parametrization procedure. Namely, one may
adjoin the original notion of time’s time variable to the configuration space q −→ q×T by rewriting one’s action in terms of a label-time parameter
λ ∈ T (see e.g. [153]). However, in the relational context in which Barbour and I work, one rather at this stage adopts 1) above.
6This being a bona fide bundle may require excision of certain of the degenerate configurations. Recall also that a fibre bundle being principal
means that the fibres and the structure group coincide [165].
7For mechanics in 1- and 2-d [55], I have found that working directly on the least redundant/most relational configuration space provides
workable relational theories. Moreover, these coincide with the restriction to those dimensions of Barbour’s theories as formulated in arbitrary
g-frame form and then reduced (Sec 3 of [87]).
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background contexts are ‘less relational’ (or only relational in a weaker sense). It is, rather, with background-independent
M-theory (or at least some limiting classical action for this) that the most purely relational program would be expected to
make contact (see Sec 9.11). N.B. How generally this clause should be imposed requires further discussion in Sec 9.11.
7 Combining temporal and configurational relationalism
Typically, the potential term V is manifestly a good g-scalar but the kinetic term T has correction terms due to ‘g-
transformations and differentials not commuting’. Consider for now theories whose configuration space carry kinetic arc ele-
ments that are homogeneous quadratic and whose associated metric has at most dependence on the QA [i.e. a (semi)Riemannian
as opposed to Finslerian or even more general geometry]. Then one can render the action MRI by supplanting the previous
T by
T := ||◦gQ||M2/2 for ◦gQA := ◦QA −∑
Z
→
gg˙Z Q
A . (19)
The auxiliary variable in use here is now interpreted as the velocity corresponding to a cyclic coordinate; I term the ensuing
variational principle JBB[P (〈s, F〉, g)], the BB standing for Barbour–Bertotti. [As a map, JBB = JS ◦ g-bundle, for
g-bundle: 〈s,F〉×g −→ P (〈s, F〉, g).] On relational grounds, however, I prefer the equivalent MPI form, the argumentation
behind which never involves the label-time non-entity or the subsequently-dethroned notion of velocity.
Here, instead of the above, I supplant the previous configurational-relationally unsatisfactory arclength (density) ds by
the g-corrected arclength dsJBB = ||dgQ||M for dgQA := dQA−
∑
Z
→
gdgZ Q
A .
(20)
The auxiliary variable in use here is now interpreted as the differential corresponding to a cyclic coordinate. One can then
repeat the preceding SSec’s treatment of conjugate momenta, quadratic constraint, evolution equations and the beginning
of the treatment of emergent time ‘by placing g suffices’ on the d, I, tem and ∗ (and, if one ever makes use of them, the◦ = D/Dλ and N; I also find it helpful in considering the formulae inter-relating these to place a g suffix on the T as a
reminder of the g-dependence residing within it). t
em(JBB)
g is no longer a relationally-satisfactory notion of time due to
manifest configurational non-relationalism. As such, I term this a g-dependent proto-time. I also name it, and its eventual
g-independent successor, after JBB rather than just after Jacobi, to reflect the upgrade to a configurational-relationally
nontrivial context.
7.1 Linear constraints: enforcers of configurational relationalism
The novel feature in the variational procedure is, rather, that variation with respect to each g-auxiliary produces one
independent secondary constraint. In this article’s principal examples, each of these uses up two degrees of freedom. (That
this is the case is testable for in a standard manner [8], and amounts to these constraints being first- and not second-class.)
Thus one ends up on the quotient space q/g of equivalence classes of q under g motions. This resolves the abovementioned
controversy, confirming the arbitrary g-frame method both to indeed implement configurational relationalism and to be an
indirect implementation thereof. I denote these linear constraints by LinZ:
0 = ∇L/∇c˙Z (or ∇d˜s/∇dcZ) := LinZ = PA δ
δdcZ
{
→
gdc¯ Q
A} , (21)
where the last form manifestly demonstrates these being purely linear in the momenta. The variational procedure behind
obtaining these is justified in Chapter 2 of [87].
One then applies the Dirac procedure to be sure that the constraints breed no further constraints (see Sec 10 for what
the consequences are if they do).
7.2 Outline of ‘best matching’ as a procedure
Barbour’s ‘best matching’ [15, 38] amounts to
Best Matching 1) construct an arbitrary g-frame corrected action.
Best Matching 2) Vary with respect to the g-auxiliary gZ to obtain the linear constraint LinZ = 0.
Best Matching 3) Solve the Lagrangian form of LinZ = 0 for gZ. (This is often an impasse.)
Best Matching 4) Substitute this back in the action to obtain a new action.
Best Matching 5) Elevate this new action to be one’s primary starting point.
Note 1) Best Matching 2) to 4) can be viewed as a minimization (or, at least, as an extremization). One is searching for a
minimizer to establish the least incongruence between adjacent physical configurations. See Sec 9.5 for more.
Note 2) Best Matching 2) to 5) can be viewed as a configuration space reduction procedure (Fig 1).
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Figure 1: One passes from the configuration space q to the principal bundle by adjoining g generators and then to the corresponding quotient
space if one succeeds in performing reduction.
7.3 Emergent Jacobi–Barbour–Bertotti time
As a distinct application of Best Matching 3), substitute its solution into the g-dependent proto-time tem(JBB)g to render it
configurational-relationally acceptable. [Albeit this is at the cost of being technically implicit and subject to the threats of
nonuniqueness and of the extremization not being solvable in practise.] I.e. the JBB emergent time is
tem(JBB) − tem(JBB)(0) =
extremum g ∈ g
of srelational
(∫
||dgQ||M/
√
W
)
. (22)
Note 1) JBB time does look rather Machian [Relationalism 6)], though a ‘boson’ caveat will appear in Sec 9.7.
Note 2) Contrarily, the Internal Time approach to the Problem of Time (c.f. Appendix A) lacks in Machianity. This is by
its finding specific degrees of freedom that make up such a time, rather than by everything contributing to the time.
8 Direct implementation of configurational relationalism
Configurational relationalism can also be implemented, at least in lower-d RPM’s, by directly constructing one’s formulation
to be g-invariant [55, 69]. One can view this as working directly on the relational configuration space. There is now no
need for any arbitrary g-frame variables, nor then do any linear constraints arise nor are these to be used as a basis for
reduction to pass to a new action. Here, instead, one’s action is already directly g-invariant i.e. on q/g =: q˜ by construction;
this is reflected by the more complicated form taken by the kinetic arc element/kinetic term. This approach [55, 69] builds
on work of Kendall [29] on the spaces of shapes and the ‘cones’ [69] over these so as to include scale, by then using the
Jacobi–Synge approach to build a natural mechanics from a metric geometry. I.e. JS(shape space) and JS(C(shape space))
= JS(relationalspace) where C stands for ‘the cone over’ (a notion explained in Chapter 3 of [87]). More generally, see Sec
9.2 for this terminology and Secs 9.6 and 9.8 for comparison between it and configuration space notions in GR.
This direct relationalspace construction can be viewed as a gestalt of both the geometrization of mechanics that moti-
vated Jacobi and Synge themselves and of the establishment of a temporally relational theory as above.8
Note 1) Chapter 3 of [87] establishes that the direct relationalspace implementation coincides with the configuration space
reduction procedure ‘Best Matching 2-5)’ in the case of 1- and 2-d RPM’s for which both are explicitly calculable.
Note 2) This provides a second foundation for RPM’s that is independent of, but the output from which is coincident with,
Barbour’s work [55, 69]. Indeed, it coincides with what arises from Barbour’s formulation upon performing reduction (see
also Chapter 3 of [87]).
Note 3) This formulation possesses emergent time as per (11), quadratic constraint (8), no linear constraints, evolution
equations in form (10) and energy constraint (15) [the last two now have no g subscripts].
9 Examples of Relational Theories
9.1 Scaled RPM action in relative Jacobi coordinates
As relative Jacobi coordinates are inter-particle (cluster) separations, I take q = r(N, d) = Rnd, and g = Rot(d) – the
d-dimensional rotation group. Then [49] using mass-weighted Jacobi coordinates ρi and rotational auxiliary variable B,
sERPMJ−JA =
√
2
∫ √
E − V (ρj · ρk alone) dsERPMJ−JA for dsERPMJ−JA = ||dBρ|| , dBρi := dρi − dB × ρi . (23)
Then the conjugate momenta are piαi = δαβδij∗Bρβi , where ∗B := d/dtem(JBB)B := √2Wd/||dBρ|| .
(24)
The surviving constraints are, as a primary constraint, E := ||pi||2/2 + V = E, and, as a secondary constraint from variation
with respect to B, L = ∑ n
i=1
ρi × pii = 0.
The emergent JBB time is now given by tem(JBB)−tem(JBB)(0) =
extremum B ∈ Rot(d)
of sERPMJ−JA
(∫
||dBρ||/
√
2W
)
.
(25)
8I use relationalspace as the portmanteau of relational space for scaled RPM and shape space for pure-shape RPM, i.e. each case’s non-redundant
configuration space. See Chapter 3 of [87] for detailed discussion of the direct relationalspace approach.
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This RPM model gives back the zero angular momentum portion of Newtonian Mechanics for the whole universe, or an
arbitrary angular momentum Newtonian Mechanics for an island universe subsystem.
9.2 Reduced/Relationalspace examples
The mathematically simplest [87] RPM’s in this respect are the N -stop metrolands (‘N particles in 1-d models’), followed
by the N -a-gonlands (‘N particles in 2-d’), the first two of which have are called, rather, triangleland [61, 62, 68, 71] and
quadrilateralland [88, 89]. The scaled N -stop metroland’s configuration space is Rn [69], for n = N − 1, with standard flat-
space metric most lucidly expressed in (ultra)spherical polar coordinates that pick out the shape–scale split and constitute
the cone over the shape space {n−1}-sphere. More generally, the RPM with q = RNd has translation-corrected configuration
space Rnd and then scaling-corrected configuration space (‘preshape space’) Snd−1.
The scaled N -a-gon’s configuration space is the cone [69] over CPN−2 [16, 55] SERPM =
√
2
∫ √
E − V (ρ,ZA)dsERPMJ−FSA ,
for dsERPM 2J−FSA = dρ
2+ρ2ds2FS , ds
2
FS =
{{1+|Z|2c}|dZ|2c−|(Z,dZ}c|2}/{1+|Z|2c}2 .
I use |Z|c2 :=
∑
a |Za|2, ( , )c for the corresponding inner product, overline to denote complex conjugate and | | to denote
complex modulus. The conjugate momenta are then piρ = ρ
∗ and piZA = ρ
2MabZ
b ∗. E := {pi2ρ +N abpiZa piZb /ρ2}/2 + V = E for
N ab the inverse of the Fubini–Study metric.
The emergent time is then given by tem(JBB)−tem(JBB)0 =
∫
ds
/√
2{E − V } .
Next, in the specific triangleland case
SERPM4 =
√
2
∫ √
E − V (I,Θ,Φ)dsERPMJ−A for dsERPM 24(flat) = dρ2 + ρ2{dΘ2 + sin2Θd2Φ}/4 (26)
which becomes, up to an overall factor of 1/4I that can be passed on to the E − V term,
dsERPM 24(flat) = dI
2 + I2{dΘ2 + sin2Θd2Φ} (27)
Here, ρ is the configuration space radius, equal to
√
I for I the total moment of inertia of the system. Φ is the relative angle
between the base and the median that are privileged by one’s coordinate choice, and Θ is a function of the ratio of the lengths
of these (see e.g. [88] for more details).
The momenta are then piI = I
∗, piΘ = I2Θ∗ and piΦ = I2sin2Θ Φ∗. E := {pi2I + {pi2Θ + pi2Φ/sin2Θ}/I2}/2 + V/4I = E/4I
for N ab the inverse of the FS metric. Finally, the emergent JBB time is now given by
tem(JBB) − tem(JBB)0 =
∫
dsERPM4(flat)/
√
{E − V }/2I . (28)
9.3 Standard spacetime presentation of GR: a relational critique
The usual covariant spacetime tensor presentation of the Einstein field equations follows from the Einstein–Hilbert action
SGREH =
∫
d4x
√
|g|Ric(g) (29)
for g the spacetime metric with determinant g and Ricci scalar Ric(g). This came about due to Einstein reconceptualizing
the nature of space and time, in good part due to the compellingness of Mach’s arguments. However, there is considerable
confusion as to how GR is and is not Machian. SR transmutes rather than eliminates absoluteness issues – one passes from
Newton’s set of unexplainedly privileged notions to another set, the ‘SR inertial frames’. Doing so amounts to a destruction
of simultaneity, which is replaced by the universal significance of null cones. In SR it is often said that space and time can
also be regarded as fused into the spacetime of Minkowski. (However, SR breaks only isolation of space and time, not their
distinction [149].) Whitrow [125] and Barbour [78] are also dismissive of Minkowski’s considering the individual notions of
time and space to be “doomed to fade away.”) Moreover, this is itself a fixed background structure, possessing a timelike
Killing vector and privileged spatial frames that precede the introduction of actual material physics into one’s worldview.
However, next, in GR matter now exerts an influence on the form of space and time, by which it is in general curved rather
than flat as Minkowski spacetime is. While in some senses that has a Machian character, Einstein’s inception of the theory
did not concretely build up on Mach’s ideas [7, 18], so whether the theory actually implements these has been a source of
quite some argument. We shall see below, however, that directly building up on some of Mach’s ideas happens to lead one
to (a portion of) GR, arriving to it in its (geometro)dynamical form [23, 18, 34, 51], so that Einstein’s GR does, in any case,
happen to contain this philosophically desirable kernel.
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9.4 GR is a relational theory. 0. Geometrodynamics as a precursor
While the role of spacetime in GR has often been touted, one should not forget that GR also admits a dynamical interpretation
in terms of evolving spatial 3-geometries, i.e. geometrodynamics. In this approach to GR, one has to preliminarily choose a
residual NOS in the sense of a spatial hypersurface of fixed topology Σ. This, I take to be a compact without boundary one
for simplicity, and 3-d as this suffices to match current observations. Under the ADM split of the spacetime metric9
gΓ∆ =
βµβµ − α2βδ βγhγδ
 (30)
with respect to a foliation by such spatial hypersurfaces, the Einstein–Hilbert action splits into the ADM–Lagrangian action
sGRADM−L =
∫
Σ
dt
∫
d3x
√
hα
{
TGRADM−L/α
2 + Ric(h)− 2Λ} , for TGRADM−L = ||h˙µν −£βhµν ||2M/4 . (31)
This action encodes the GR Hamiltonian constraint
H := Nµνρσpiµνpiρσ −
√
h{Ric(h)− 2Λ} = 0 (32)
from variation with respect to the lapse α and the momentum constraint
Mµ := −2Dνpiνµ = 0 (33)
from variation with respect to the shift βµ. The latter is interpretable geometrically as GR not being just a dynamics of
3-metrics (‘metrodynamics’) but furthermore that moving the spatial points around with 3-diffeomorphisms does not affect
the physical content of the theory. The remaining information in the metric concerns the ‘underlying geometrical shape’.
This is how GR is, more closely, a dynamics of 3-geometries in this sense: geometrodynamics. This description is less (rather
than completely non-) redundant (the partial redundancy being due to the Hamiltonian constraint not yet being addressed).
Some useful notes about (in some cases precursors to) Problem of Time facets are as follows.
Note 1) The GR constraints Mµ and H close in the form of the Dirac Algebra [8, 158].
Note 2) In the dynamical approach to GR, one often considers not one spatial hypersurface Σ but a foliation of the spacetime
by such spatial hypersurfaces. Moreover, classical GR has the further property of refoliation invariance: the evolution
between two given spatial hypersurfaces is independent of which foliation interpolating the two is used. Both the closure of
Note 1) and foliation-independence are held to be valuable properties of classical GR. Moreover, both of these have relational
character – the first via Sec 10 and the second due to foliation dependence in GR amounting to coordinate-dependent physics,
at least from the point of view in which conventional GR’s spacetime notion is taken as given.
Note 3) The Global Problem of Time is due to a single time function not always being definable over the whole of
spacetime/space. Classically, this is already present but is a relatively straightforward issue of the finiteness of coordinate
charts and the subsequent standard meshing condition being required in changes involving passing from one GR coordinate
time to another.
Note 4) Quantities commuting with both Mµ and H are Dirac observables; quantities commuting only with the former are
Kucharˇ observables. The Problem of Observables facet of the Problem of Time is that these are hard to find (especially
the Dirac ones), though Rovelli’s own opinion on this matter is that this be sidestepped by considering only a weaker notion
of partial observables (see Sec 13). LMB relationalism favours Kucharˇ ’s stance [60], or, at least a partly-Dirac stance [93]
(i.e. commutativity with H still being required alongside permission to view H as distinct from a gauge constraint, that in
itself constituting a deviation from Dirac’s writings [8]). In fact, following Bell [164] I prefer talking in terms of beables rather
than observables, especially in the context of Quantum Cosmology.
9.5 GR is a relational theory. 1. Sandwich and Chronos antecedents
I continue here with discussion of the thin sandwich approach, in which Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler [6, 7] regarded hµν and
h˙µν as knowns. [I.e. the ‘thin’ limit of taking the bounding ‘slices of bread’ hµν(λ = 1) and hµν(λ = 2) as knowns.] This is
solved for the spacetime ‘filling’ in between. In more detail,
BSW 0) They take as primary a conventional difference-type action for geometrodynamics.
BSW 1) They vary this with respect to the ADM lapse α.
9I use capital Greek letters as spacetime indices. The spatial topology Σ is taken to be compact without boundary. hµν is a spatial 3-metric
thereupon [within the perspective of (36), the induced metric upon this by the spacetime metric gΓ∆, with determinant h, covariant derivative
Dµ, Ricci scalar Ric(h) and conjugate momentum piµν . α is the lapse and βµ is the shift. £β is the Lie derivative with respect to β
µ. t is GR
coordinate time. Λ is the cosmological constant. The GR configuration space metric is Mµνρσ := {hµρhνσ −hµνhρσ}, i.e. the undensitized inverse
DeWitt supermetric with determinant M and inverse Nµνρσ that is itself the undensitized DeWitt supermetric, hµρhνσ − hµνhρσ/2. I note that
this metric, and thus the GR kinetic term, is indefinite. The densitized versions are
√
h times the former and 1/
√
h times the latter. To represent
this as a configuration space metric (i.e. with just two indices, and downstairs), use DeWitt’s 2 index to 1 index map [98].
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BSW 2) They solve resulting equation for α.
BSW 3) They substitute this back in the ADM action to obtain a new action: the BSW action,
sGRBSW =
√
2
∫
dt
∫
Σ
d3x
√
hdsGRADM−L
√
Ric(h)− 2Λ . (34)
BSW 4) They then take this action as one’s primary starting point.
BSW 5) They vary with respect to the shift βµ to obtain the GR linear momentum constraint, Mµ = 0.
BSW 6) They posit to solve the Lagrangian form of Mµ = 0 for the shift βµ.
BSW 7) They posit to then substitute this into the computational formula for the lapse α.
BSW 8) Finally, they substitute everything into the formula for the extrinsic curvature to construct the region of spacetime
contiguous to the original slice datum.
Note 1) Unfortunately the p.d.e. involved in this attempted elimination is the thin sandwich equation; this is difficult and not
much is known about it (obstructions based on this are termed the Thin Sandwich Problem, which is one of the facets
of the Problem of Time). Counterexamples to its solubility have been found [156, 161], while good behaviour in a restricted
sense took many years to establish [169].
Note 2) BSW 0–3) are a multiplier elimination; they can be reformulated as a cyclic velocity elimination i.e. a passage to the
Routhian [153, 87] directly equivalent to the Euler–Lagrange action to Jacobi action move mentioned in the Introduction, or
a cyclic differential elimination.
Note 3) BSW 4–6) directly parallel Best Matching 1–3) modulo the upgrade from multiplier shift to cyclic velocity/differential
of the instant. Thus in the geometrodynamics case, Best Matching is hampered in practise by the Thin Sandwich Problem.
A general phrasing for this is the obstruction, whether practical-computational or provable-analytical, to
solving LinZ = 0 for whichever form of gZ auxiliaries it contains . (35)
Moreover, ‘sandwich’ is clearly a geometrodynamical, or more generally Diff(3)- or foliability-specific name, whereas ‘best
matching’ is a more universal one, so in fact I choose the name Best Matching Problem for the general theoretical
problem (35) of which the Thin Sandwich Problem is but the particular case corresponding to theories with some kind of
NOS Diff-invariance. This reflects that the sandwich problem is both generalized, and placed on relational terms, in the
present article.
Note 4) BSW did not consider the culmination move Best Matching 4) of this which (merely formally) produces an action
on superspace.
Note 5) BSW 7) is, however, a primitive version of the tem(JBB) computation (via the N to I˙ to dI = dtem(JBB) and hence
tem(JBB) progression). There is a presupposed (BSW) versus emergent (relational approach) difference in the status of the
computed object too.
Note 6) As far as I am aware, Christodoulou [12, 13] was the first person to cast BSW 7) as an emergent time [amounting
to the differential form of (22), which he termed the ‘chronos principle’]. Moreover, like Wheeler, he did not base this on
relational first principles. [Though Christodoulou was certainly aware in doing so of some of what Barbour and I have held
to be the Leibniz–Mach position on relational time: “They contain the statement that time is not a separate physical entity
in which the changing of the physical system takes place. It is the measure of the changing of the physical system itself that
is time”]. He deduced the generalization of (35) to include gauge fields minimally-coupled to GR involving shift and the
Yang–Mills generalizations of the electric potential [14]. I credit Alevizos for pointing out this connection between Barbour’s
and Christodoulou’s work.
Note 7) BSW 8) is subsequent step concerning dynamical evolution which for geometrodynamics has nontrivial geometrical
content.
Note 8) I have thus clearly laid out how the technical content of Barbour’s Best Matching notion resides within a very
immediate generalization of the original BSW paper. Wheeler did not, however, have the relational significance that underpins
this procedure, or the cyclic auxiliary coordinate formulation of the next SSec.
9.6 GR as a relational theory. 3. Actual relational reformulation
The Barbour-type indirect formulation of RPM’s (6,19) makes these parallels particularly clear. In the geometrodynamical
counterpart of this, q = Riem(Σ) – the space of Riemannian 3-metrics on some spatial manifold of fixed topology Σ (taken
to be compact without boundary for simpleness). This choice of 3-metric objects is a simple one (one geometrical object,
rather than more than one), moreover one that is
A) useful for physics given its significance in terms of lengths.
B) Mathematically rich – one then gets a connection for free – the metric connection – as well as the notions of curvature
and of Hodge star.
Nevertheless, one is entitled to view this choice as a possibly inessential simplicity postulate.
The group of irrelevant motions g is now Diff(Σ), i.e., the diffeomorphisms on Σ. This configurational relationalism is
implemented indirectly by introducing auxiliary variables that represent arbitrary-Diff(Σ) corrections. Superspace(Σ) =
Riem(Σ)/Diff(Σ). Temporal relationalism is implemented by building a MRI/MPI action [34, 47, 51] [this is similar to the
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above BSW action but now properly combining the temporal and configurational relationalisms]. The relational formulation
of geometrodynamics is valuable in providing guidance in yet further investigations of alternative conceptual foundations for
GR [15, 22, 34, 51, 57], and as regards addressing the Problem of Time in Quantum Gravity (see Sec and Part III of [87]).
Now,10
srelationalGR = 2
∫
dλ
∫
d3x
√
h
√
TrelationalGR {Ric(h)− 2Λ} =
√
2
∫
dλ
∫
d3x
√
h
√
Ric(h)− 2ΛdsrelationalGR (36)
for TrelationalGR := ||◦Fh||M2/4 or dsrelationalGR := ||dFh||M/2 and ◦Fhµν := h˙µν −£F˙hµν or dFhµν := dhµν −£dFhµν . (37)
In this case, the action is a JBB[P (〈Riem(Σ), M〉, Diff(Σ))] for a particular potential proportional to Ric(h).
Note 1) The relational action bears many similarities to the better-known BSW one, but supersedes it via attaining manifest
temporal relationalism. The two become indistinguishable for minisuperspace: Mµνρσ(hγδ(x
ω)) collapses to an ordinary 6×6
matrix MΓ∆ or further in the diagonal case (a 3× 3 matrix MAB) – the ‘minisupermetric’.
Then the conjugate momenta are piµν =
√
hMµνρσ∗Fhρσ where ∗F := d/dtem(JBB)F := √2{Ric(h)− 2Λ}d/||dFh||M .
MPI/MRI gives GR’s Hamiltonian constraint (32) as a primary constraint [8]; this has the momenta contribute quadratically
but not linearly.
Also, variation with respect to the auxiliary Diff(Σ)-variables Fµ gives the GR momentum constraint (33). Just as for
the standard ADM approach, the momentum constraint is interpretable geometrically as GR being a geometrodynamics. In
the relational approach, GR has an analogue of emergent JBB time (in this context crediting also Christodoulou [13]),
tem(JBB)(xµ)− tem(JBB)0 (xµ) =
extremum Fµ ∈ Diff(Σ)
of srelationalGR
∫
||dFh||M
/√
Ric(h)− 2Λ . (38)
This represents the same quantity as the usual spacetime-assumed formulation of GR’s proper time, and, in the (predomi-
nantly) homogeneous cosmology setting, the cosmic time. It also coincides with GR’s own version of emergent semiclassical
(alias WKB) time (see Appendix A and Sec 16.4 for a brief explanation of what this is).
Interpretation 4) Next, Wheeler asked [9] why H takes the form it does and whether this could follow from first principles
(‘7th route’ to GR) rather than from mere rearrangement of the Einstein equations. To date, there are two different answers
which tighten wide classes of ansa¨tze down to the GR form (see [51] for a comparison of these).
Answer A) [Hojman–Kucharˇ–Teitelboim] [158] is from deformation algebra first principles (this assumes embeddability into
spacetime).
Answer B) [Barbour–Foster–O’Murchadha and I] [34, 35, 37, 36, 40, 39, 45, 47, 51, 56] the ‘relativity without relativity’
approach, which lies within the relational program, arrives at actions similar to the BSW one, and is the subject of the next
two SSecs.
9.7 Relativity without relativity (and addition of matter)
Furthermore, adopting the relational first principles, without assumption of additional features derived in ADM’s approach,
leads to the recovery of the BFO-A action of GR as one of very few consistent choices within a large class of such actions.
E.g. one does not need to assume the GR form of the kinetic metric or of the potential. One then has a family of trial actions
JBB[P (〈Riem(Σ), MW 〉, Diff(Σ))] for MW the general ultralocal supermetric MWµνρσ := hµρhνσ −Whµνhρσ and a potential
ansatz such as Wtrial = ARic(h) +B for A, B constant,
sRWRtrial =
√
2
∫ √
Wtrialdstrialquad . (39)
Then relational postulates alongside a few simplicities already give this since the Dirac procedure [8] prevents most other
choices of potential term dstrial from working [34, 37, 45, 47, 51, 36, 40] alongside fixing W to take the DeWitt value 1 of GR
as one of very few possibilities. This amounts to a classical precursor of the Spacetime Reconstruction Problem facet of the
Problem of Time, which, once again, the machinery of the classical GR constraints resolves.
The above relational formulation of GR is furthermore robust to the inclusion of a sufficiently full set of fundamental
matter sources so as to describe nature. Thus electromagnetism is included in [34], Yang–Mills Theory in [35], spin-1/2
fermions in [39] and scalar and spin-1/2 fermion gauge theories [39, 45, 96]. Moreover, it does not do so in a way by which
relational postulates alone pick out these matter theories. ([51, 47, 56] demonstrate how earlier claims to the contrary [34] in
fact contain additional tacit simplicity assumptions. A further gap, not yet addressed, is that the possibility of second-class
constraints is not properly catered for in any uniqueness by exhaustion proof so far given.)
10F˙
µ
is the velocity of the frame; in the manifestly relational formulation of GR, this cyclic velocity plays the role more usually played by the
shift Lagrange multiplier coordinate.
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One way some of these things are accommodated is through lifting the homogeneous quadraticity restriction [153, 39]
(which is not per se relational). In particular this allows for mechanics with linear ‘gyroscopic’ terms [153], as well as moving
charges, spin-1/2 fermions and the usual theories coupling these to gauge fields, scalars and GR. The form of action here is
of Randers type [151, 94]
sRWRtrial−A =
∫ ∫
Σ
dΣ
{√
2
√
Wtrialdstrialquad + ds
trial
lin
}
, (40)
with dstriallin then not contributing to the quadratic constraint or to the emergent JBB time (thus this is not entirely universal,
though the potential associated with such fields does sit inside the square root and thus itself does contribute to these things).
dstriallin does however contribute to the linear constraints.
A further implementation of Mach [E.A.: Relationalism 7B)] is that time is abstracted from BOSONIC change.
I further discuss these variants on relationalism involving boson–fermion distinctions (and the supersymmetric case) in [96].
Note: (40) also renders clear how to extend Christodoulou’s Chronos Principle working to include fermions.
Other simplicities involve neglecting the possibility of metric–matter cross-terms and other terms that one knows appear in
the canonical formulation of more general fields, as well as the restriction on allowed orders of derivatives that is much more
ubiquitous in theoretical physics. By such means, some more general/complicated possibilities can be included among the
relationally-formulable theories:
1) Brans–Dicke theory [34],
2) Proca theory [47], and
3) local-SR-cone-violating and equivalence principle violating vector–tensor theories [56].
Thus, contrary to the claims/speculations in [34], relationalism does not derive or imply the equivalence principle or a universal
null cone. (The former effectively requires some form of geometrodynamical equivalence principle postulate [56, 158], while
the latter requires a number of nonrelational simplicity assumptions.)
9.8 Conformogeometrodynamical formulations on relational foundations
York time tYork := 23hµνpi
µν/
√
h = c(λ coordinate label time alone, i.e. a spatial hypersurface constant)
(41)
is [48, 50, 53] more or less [87] paralleled by an ‘Euler time’ variable tEuler :=
∑
i
Ri · Pi. This is all underlied for both GR
and RPM’s by scale–shape splits, the role of scale being played by
√
I = ρ or I for RPM’s and by such as the scalefactor a or√
h in GR. In both cases it is then tempting to use the singled-out scale as a time variable but this runs into monotonicity
problems. These are avoided by using as times the quantities conjugate to (a function of) the scale, such as tYork or tEuler.
Moreover, GR in the conformogeometrical formulation on CMC slices [10, 11] can be reformulated [46] as a relational theory
in which g consists both of Diff(Σ) and a certain group of conformal transformations. Conf(Σ) are conformal transformations;
CRiem(Σ) is pointwise superspace = Riem(Σ)/Conf(Σ). CS(Σ) is conformal superspace = Riem(Σ)/Diff(Σ) S© Conf(Σ), for
S© denoting semi-direct product [155, 162]. {CS + V}(Σ) is conformal superspace to which has been adjoined a single
global degree of freedom: the spatial volume of the universe. This can be viewed as Riem(Σ)/Diff(Σ) S© VPConf(Σ), for
VPConf(Σ) the global volume-preserving conformal transformations. CS(Σ) and (CS + V)(Σ) have on a number of occasions
been claimed to be the space of true dynamical degrees of freedom of GR [11, 157, 173, 46, 73]. Following from the alternative
theory of [28] and [44], [46] used volume-preserving conformal transformations. and [74, 76, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86] additionally
then considered a linking theory approach. Of the latter, I comment that using a Hamiltonian formulation is cleaner, but
also that these papers use in excess of the usual amount of canonical theory; I do not know whether this is necessary; the
current article presents the case for questioning excess structures in relational approaches.
9.9 Relationalism and the Ashtekar variables formulation of GR
Proponents of Ashtekar variables often use the word ‘relational’ of their approach. However, this word has not hitherto been
systematically used in their program in the full LMB or LMB-A sense; instead they use this word with less detail and/or
to carry (a subset of) the perspectival meanings of Sec 14. Nevertheless, I state here that the Ashtekar variables scheme
can be formulated in the full LMB or LMB-A relational scheme. This is modulo a small glitch at the start of such an
investigation, which nevertheless turns out to be entirely surmountable. Namely, that the pure gravity case of the Ashtekar
variables approach is not castable in temporally relational form at the level of the classical Lagrangian. From the point of
view in which spacetime is presupposed [39], in which one sets about elimination of the lapse to form the temporally relational
action, this glitch is due to the following. The lapse-uneliminated action is purely linear in the lapse. This is because the
well-known ‘pure-T’ character of Ashtekar’s canonical action for pure GR, in contrast to the more usual ‘T − V’ form of
the geometrodynamical action. Thus the variation with respect to the lapse produces an equation independent of the lapse.
Thus the lapse cannot now be eliminated from its own variational equation. However, it is clear that addition of matter
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fields breaks this pure linearity in the lapse, so this unusual accident that blocks the elimination of the lapse from its own
variational equation ceases to occur and a temporally relational action can be obtained.
Thus that the Barbour/LMB-relational literature’s looks to be fixated with GR in geometrodynamical form as regards
which examples it uses is in fact down to a matter of taste/of each paper’s applications, rather than being in any way
being indicatory of LMB-relationalism only applying to the older geometrodynamics and not the newer Ashtekar variables
work that underlies LQG. It is then surely of foundational importance for Ashtekar variables programs for them to be
revealed to be relational in this additional well-motivated and historically and philosophically well-founded way in addition
to the various other meanings that they have hitherto been pinning on the word ‘relational’ in the Ashtekar variables/LQG
program. Pointing this out is one of the main applications of this article. Configurational relationalism for Ashtekar variables
formulations has g = SU(2)× Diff(3). Then variation with respect to the additional SU(2)-auxiliaries produces the SU(2)
Yang–Mills–Gauss constraint that is ubiquitous in the Ashtekar variables literature, whilst variation with respect to the
Diff(3)-auxiliaries produces the Ashtekar variables form of the GR momentum constraint. The Hamiltonian constraint arises
as a primary constraint, and the usual form for a JBB time emerges. An Ashtekar variables formulation of a type of GR
shape dynamics has recently appeared [90].
9.10 Is there a supersymmetric extension of RPM and does it toy-model supergravity?
Compared to theories preceding it, supersymmetry is conceptually strange in how the product of two supersymmetry opera-
tions produces a spatial transformation, and possibly also via how the supersymmetry constraint in supergravity is the square
root of the Hamiltonian constraint [159]. As such, there is some chance that the supersymmetry transformation is one of
not conceptually sound, or conceptually deeper than, other transformations, and the relational perspective could be one that
had more to say about this matter. Thus, the relational program might be able to provide its own prediction as to whether
to expect supersymmetry in nature. Conversely, insisting on supersymmetry might expose the current conceptualization of
Relationalism to be insufficient. See Secs 10, 11 and [96] for more.
9.11 RPM’s versus String Theory
Aside from Sec 6’s use of the preclusion of perturbative strings to sharpen up criteria for relationalism, there are some
conceptual parallels between passing from studying point particles to studying strings and passing from point particles to
studying relational quantities only. These are comparable from a conceptual perspective; whether each of these is rich,
tractable and has anything to say about Quantum Gravity is another matter. The latter is moreover more conservative – the
relational quantities come from careful thought about the original problem rather than replacing it with a distinct problem
as in String Theory. This gives less new structure leading perhaps to less mathematical richness, but it it would appear to
be a safer bet as regards the “hypotheses non fingo” tradition.
Exporting the configurational relationalism/best matching ideas to other parts of physics could conceivably be of interest
even if not accompanied by the further demands of no background spatial structures or of temporal relationalism. E.g. one
could consider what form these ideas take for target space theories of which strings on a given background. Finally, one
would expect nonperturbative M-theory to have both of these features (relationalism and extended objects).
Provided that supersymmetry can be accommodated into (a suitable generalization of) Relationalism, I conjecture that
relational notions along the lines of those in this article are necessary for any truly GR-embracing notion of background
independence for M-theory11 Since background-independence amounts to a Problem of Time, it would then be exceedingly
likely for M-theory to have one of those too. Thus study of the Problem of Time is likely to be a valuable investment from
the perspective of developing and understanding M-theory too. Geometrodynamics (very easily generalizable to arbitrary-d)
could be seen as a first toy model of spatially 10-d M-theory. There may be better RPM’s and geometrodynamics models for
this particular setting, e.g. spatially 10-d supergravity (which is a low-energy/‘semiclassical’ limit of M-theory).
The situation with extended objects that occupy/furnish a multiplicity of notions of space is, in addition to supersymmetry,
an interesting frontier in which to further explore the relational postulates.
10 Further compatibility restrictions
Now we have covered some examples, we can return to this...
Relationalism 9) [E.A.] A) Nontriviality g cannot be too big [if dim(g) ≥ dim(q) – 1 then the relational procedure will
yield a theory with not enough degrees of freedom to be relational, or even an inconsistent theory].
B) Further structural compatibility is required.
Example 1) If one uses such as Sim(d1) or Eucl(d1) with q(N, d2), it is usually for d1 = d2 (or at least d1 ≤ d2).
11To avoid confusion, I note here that some other uses of the term ‘background (in)dependence’ in the String Theory literature have a different
meaning, namely concerning the effect of choice of vacuum on string perturbations.
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Example 2) If one uses Diff(Σ1) to match to Riem(Σ2), it is usually for Σ1 = Σ2, or at least for the two to be obviously
related (e.g. taking out Diff(S1) from Riem(S1 × S1)
C) More concretely, g has to have a (preferably natural, faithful) group action on q.
Relationalism 10) [Barbour and E.A. ] In looking to do fundamental modelling, one may well have a strong taste for lack of
extraneity, e.g. always taking out all rotations rather than leaving a preferred axis.
I) Aut(a) is then a very obvious designate for this, though some subgroup of Aut(a) might also be desirable, and there is
also the issue of automorphisms of up to which level of structure. Then Aut(a) and its subgroups definitely comply with A)
and stand a good chance of suitably satisfying criteria B) and C).
II) One may also have a strong taste for eliminating as many extraneous properties as possible [Barbour’s view], though
under some circumstances there may be strong practical reasons to not eliminate some [E.A.’s counter-view].
Example 1) One may wish to retain the scale, thus using Eucl(d) rather than Sim(d) for RPM’s, or and superspace(Σ) or {CS
+ V}(Σ) instead of CS(Σ) for geometrodynamics, so as to have a viable cosmological theory and possibly for reasons of time
provision. Scale is possibly undesirable from the relational perspective via being a single heterogeneous addendum to the
shapes [41, 73]. The cone structure makes scale especially extraneous in RPM’s – it has the same sort of dynamics irrespective
of what the shapes are. It may then seem quite conceptually undesirable for scale to play so prominent a roles in Cosmology.
However, 1) there are currently no credible alternatives to this as regards explaining Cosmology. 2) This heterogeneity can be
useful by alignment with choices that would be harder to make without it, renders scale more presentable from a conceptual
perspective. This is the position I will take in the upcoming ‘Conformal Nature of the Universe’ Conference at the Perimeter
Institute. See Sec 16 for how various approaches fare in this regard.
Example 2) Quotienting out Diff(Σ) and Conf(Σ) does not interfere with the existence of spinors, but for further/other choices
one has a lack of such guarantees [163], likely compromising one’s ability to model spin-1/2 fermion matter. Moreover, it is
well-known that some choices of Σ by themselves preclude the existence of fermions (see e.g. [165]), and that orientability of
Σ is also often desired. (But supersymmetric extensions are quite clearly also compatible in this sense [96].)
In more detail, one has a background NOS a, which has properties deemed redundant, all or some of which can be modelled
as such. There is then some level of structure 〈a,Pmodelled〉 within the 〈a,PTotal〉 = 〈a, 〈Pmodelled,Punmodelled〉〉. One then
builds the configuration space of actually mathematically manipulable part-tangible part-intangible entities to lean on the
structure of a, so I denote it in this Sec by q(a). Then finally one passes to
q(a)/Aut(〈a,Pmodelled〉) . (42)
BB82 has a means of modelling continuous transformations at the level of Riemannian geometry. As per Chapter 2 of [87],
one can also conceive of a in such a way that discrete isometries can be considered as well as continuous ones. If one fails
to be able to model PTotal, then the automorphisms in question will not be freeing one of all the levels of structure/aspects
of a. This is clearly the case for superspace(Σ): quotienting out Diff(Σ) from Riem(Σ) clearly does not free one from what
choice of Σ one made in setting up Riem(Σ). This is because Σ pertains to the level of topological structure, and rendering
the diffeomorphisms irrelevant is only a freeing from background metric structure.
The relationalist who takes minimalism to an extreme would then aim to remove all sources of indiscernibility and actors
that cannot be acted upon. See Secs 10 and 16 as regards the status of scale, and Chapter 14 of [87] as regards whether
spatial topology in GR is discernible and can be acted upon; another example is how dimension is not primary for RPM’s
(Chapter 2 of [87] explains how 3-particle RPM’s cannot distinguish between dimension 2 or higher).
The objective of relationalism is thus
q(a)/Aut(〈a,Pheld to be unphyical〉), or possibly even q(a)/Aut(〈a,Ptotal〉) . (43)
Relationalism 11) [BFO–A]. Note that q (the entity taken to have some tangible physical content) has the a posteriori
right to reject [34, 47, 51, 56] a proposed g by triviality or inconsistency that go beyond 1), arising instead via, for the
moment, the Dirac procedure yielding further constraints.
Example 1) If one attempts to use g = id with Riem(Σ) and a BSW-like trial action (like O´ Murchadha [36] or I [37]), one
finds that enlarging g to Diff(Σ) is enforced by the Mµ arising as an integrability of H. This also exemplifies how not all
subgroups of Aut are guaranteed to serve.
Note 2) Additionally, a given q, g pair still constitutes a substantial ambiguity as to the form of the action principle. This
can sometimes be truncated with simplicity postulates like that the action is not to contain higher than first (or occasionally
second) derivatives, but ambiguities beyond that still often remain.
Example 2) The potential is completely free in scaled RPM and free up to homogeneity in pure-shape RPM.
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Example 3) One can have GR or Euclidean GR or strong gravity for the Riem(Σ), Diff(Σ) pair with action restricted to
contain at most first label-time derivatives and quadratically and at most second spatial derivatives.
Note 3) This scheme retains considerable freedom. Relationalism does not exert a highly unique control over the form that
theoretical physics is to take [though Relationalism 10) and 11) can sometimes help with this].
Relationalism 11) Quotienting out the g is to remove all the structure in the q that is actually extraneous. However,
precisely what structures/features are extraneous in the case of the universe we live in is not so clear. [E.g., again, whether
to discard scale.] One passes to
q(a)/Aut(〈a,P〉) (44)
for P the structures up to a certain mathematical level (e.g. metric geometry or topology). One might ideally wish for
relationalism to remove all levels of structure of a.
In particular, g = id is too trivial for most of theoretical physics, whilst a number of further GR features come from g = Diff
or some generalization (Diff × Conf, the SuperDiff of Supergravity) or possibly some slight weakening, such as by attitude
to the large diffeomorphisms [174] or restriction to the transverse diffeomorphisms [191].
I next consider four structural expansions on Barbour’s ‘q is primary’ postulate [Relationalism 3)].
1) One usually considers phase space Phase, or at least adjoining momenta P to the configurations Q. This generalizes q
to a more general concept of state space, which I denote by s. I will consider these expansions at the classical level first,
and then at the quantum level, where such as Hilbert spaces of quantum states play the role of s.
2) Categorizing. One may well wish to consider whichever s as objects alongside corresponding morphisms m to form the
category (s, m). Examples of morphisms include the point transformations Point for q and the canonical transformations
Can for s.
3) Perspecting. Taking, say, s to be primary in fact amounts to (especially in the case of whole-universe studies) considering
some set of subsystems of s.
4) Propositioning. If, say, we take s to be primary, Physics is in fact about the propositions about s, Prop(s), rather than
about s itself.
As we shall see, some additional issues concerning how to compose some of these expansions is crucial.
11 State space extension of q-primality?
I consider passing from conceiving q to be primary to suggesting that Q and P are operationally distinct; I refer to the
ensuing state space as RigPhase. From the more usual perspective, this is a privileged polarization [177, 166] of Phase
(phase space) that maintains the distinction between the physical P’s and Q’s. On the other hand, a distinct and far more
common viewpoint is that phase space
Phase = (T ∗(q), { , }) (45)
is central. Here, T ∗(q) is the cotangent bundle (for simple bosonic theories) of momenta over the configurations and { , }
is the Poisson bracket, so that this is a Poisson algebra. N.B. the status of RigPhase in this program is as an option that is
more structurally minimalist.
RigPhase Motivation 1) As argued in Sec 3, considering more minimalist possibilities is very much part and parcel of relational
thinking. One such avenue then would be to investigate what happens if one weakens the amount of structure assumed in
the study of the ‘associated spaces’ of the principles of dynamics. There are very strong reasons why q (or something
with an equivalent amount of physical information in it) is indispensable, but some parts of the conventional structure of
phase space are more questionable. Much as one can envisage preferred-foliation counterparts of GR spacetime, one can also
construe of preferred-polarization versions of phase space. Whereas relational perspectives usually view preferred foliations
of spacetime as less physical, I contend that, at the level of the associated abstract spaces of the Principles of Dynamics, the
relationalist’s ontological hierarchy as regards preferred versions of these spaces is the reverse of that for spacetime itself. My
argument then is that the operational distinction between configuration and impact measurements can be encoded by using
a preferred polarization centred about the physical q (as opposed to any other nontrivially canonically-related mathematical
q). As a general point, one should not necessarily postulate that physical entities that are operationally distinct have to be
mixable just because transformations that mix them can be mathematically defined. One should not confuse ‘is often useful
to transform’ with giving unwarrantedly unconditional physical significance to the transformations in question.
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I argue the practical implementation of RigPhase to be as follows. I hold that the physicality of q is not the centre of this
argument; that is, rather, operational distinguishability between the P’s on the one hand and the Q’s on the other. If one
includes fermions, one can operationally tell apart fermionic quantities that manage to be positions and momenta at once
from quantities that solely manifest themselves as configurations and quantities that solely manifest themselves as momenta.
In this way, the scheme extends to cases where phase spaces are not just simple tangent bundles over configuration spaces,
via operational distinguishibility now being tripartite [96]. See this reference also for how, were supersymmetry to exist in
nature, it could impose limitations on the applicability of Relationalism 3) and its development using less-than-phase-space
constructs such as RigPhase.
As regards primality, firstly I only wish to consider direct measurements rather than inferences (which could e.g. involve
inferring distances from momentum-type measurements connected to photon momenta as in sight or spectral lines). One can
dissociate from this problem by thinking in terms of simple ‘blind feeling out’ measurements on a scale small enough that one
can reach out to feel (for all that there will often be strong practical limitations on this). The virtue of this approach is that
one’s configuration measurements for particle mechanics are all geometrical: local angles, adjoining rulers to the separations
between objects; the blind Geometer’s work is free from the impact connotations that enter his sighted colleague’s work.
[The latter’s methodology will however often have greater practicality, e.g. if both worked as surveyors...]
Next, in GR in geometrodynamical form, Riemannian 3-geometry measurements of space are again cleanly separated
out from gravitational momentum/extrinsic curvature. Note how in the mechanics–geometrodynamics sequence of physical
theories, one can pass from a simple notion of relational geometry measurements being operationally primary to a more
complicated one (argued for e.g. in [12, 14]. A theme that may then support part of the argument for the primality of
configurational measurements is that geometrical measurements are primary.12
From this perspective, it is somewhat incongruous for triad information to be considered as momentum-like within
the Ashtekar variables type approaches given that this is another form of space-geometric information. It would likewise
be somewhat incongruous if the Ashtekar A were to be only an indirectly inferrable quantity.13 On the other hand, the
foundations of geometrodynamics are not incongruous in this way, though the above-linked footnote does place limitations
on, and give alternatives to, this particular sense of incongruence fostered by this Sec’s tentative expansion of the point of
view that q is primary. The debate about whether lengths, impacts, times, frequencies... are the most primary things to
measure is indeed an old and unsettled one. Rods are arguably a less deep notion/apparatus than clocks e.g. via Bondi’s
argument [124] that they are made out of quantum matter which is ultimately underlaid by frequencies. Also, by their nature
and function, rods are necessarily macroscopic [123] and so interact with their environment in uncontrollable ways, whilst
microscopic clocks are indeed possible. I wish to make a somewhat different point too: that, regardless of primality, one can
tell apart whether what one is measuring is instantaneous-configuration information or impact information.
RigPhase Motivation 2) One might doubt canonical transformations due to their clash with the common notion of ‘adding
in a potential’. If this is to be considered as a structurally minor change, as is often done, then one has a problem due to the
asymmetry between the complication caused by adding a Q4 potential, say, as compared to the major structural upheaval of
adding a P 4 kinetic term to one’s Hamiltonian. Of course, this can be dealt with by accepting that canonical transformations
imply that ‘adding a potential’ is as great a structural upheaval (e.g. the above two additions to an HO are identical to each
other under canonical transformation). This translates to changing the habitual simplicity requirements on Hamiltonians and
Lagrangians due to their canonical disparity, and that doubtlessly cuts down on widely applicable theorems that depended
on such canonically-disparate simplicity requirements. One might then hold all such results to have been empty anyway, but
one might attempt to keep them by allotting particular significance to the physics in its presentation centred about q. By
the above, it is also clear that canonical transformations are at odds with statements of simplicity such as ‘at most quadratic
in the momenta’. Yet further motivations for weakening Phase space at the QM level are given in Sec 18, along with some
theoretical consequences.
12Moreover, this is not to be because of geometry constituting a layer of structure prior to the account of the physical objects themselves, since
the context in which configurations are being considered as primary is a relational one and one which is specifically to encompass GR, for which
there is indeed no prior fixed notion of Riemannian geometry.
13Here one usually argues (see e.g. [105] instead for the progression from Electromagnetism to Yang–Mills Theory to GR in Ashtekar variables
form as theories based on notions of connection. As regards the current Appendix’s theme of operational distinction and most primary types of
measurements, firstly I note that in classical electromagnetism it is B that is measured (rather than A), and that this is operationally distinct from
measuring E. Secondly, mentioning Yang–Mills Theory brings one face to face with problems with centring one’s thinking in terms of classical
measurements; of course, QM offers much wider challenges than this the idea of operational primality of measurements of configurations. [This
idea may only reflect a simple top-down thinking, c.f. Sec 19.] As regards measuring Ashtekar’s A, one usually argues that one can make do with
measuring curvature quantities and eventually inferring A from them.
Moreover, the solidity of the above sequence as a first-principles scheme partly rests on the notion of ‘connection’ receiving a conceptually
clear treatment (to be more precise, the corresponding notion of holonomy is particularly important for LQG). For Ashtekar variables, this is
itself a geometrical perspective, for a yet more complicated notion of geometry than GR’s usual (semi)Riemannian geometry. [Both Ashtekar’s E
and A can be construed of as geometrical objects. However, it is the E whose sense of geometry (triad variable) ties more directly to the more
straightforwardly realized spatial Riemannian geometry. The B-field does have more purely geometrical connotations by its being the curvature
associated with the connection, but the physical realization of this geometry is more subtle than that of mechanics, 3-metric geometries or their
triad counterpart.]
Moreover, the Ashtekar variables case does run into some contentions (e.g. [181]) as regards which features are appropriate for a connection
serving this purpose, though Thiemann [192] terms this ‘aesthetic’). On the other hand, the solidity of this scheme as obtained from rearrangement
of the usual geometrodynamical conceptualization of canonical GR rests on whether it is appropriate to extend the classical phase space to include
degenerate configurations, as well as on canonical transformations.
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As continuation of MRI and MPI formulations, APhase, DAPhase, ARigPhase and DARigPhase options are relevant alter-
natives at this point . The A stands for ‘almost’, referring to it almost being Phase, except that the unphysical auxiliary
variables’ velocities (rather than their momenta) remain present; thus its physical content is equivalent to that of Phase.
The DA stands for ‘differential almost’ i.e. the parametrization-irrelevant form in which the unphysical auxiliary variables’
differentials dg are present rather than their velocities g˙. These then have defined on them of almost-Hamiltonians and
differential almost-Hamiltonians; this amounts to a fullest distinction at the level of ‘total’ [8] objects: HTotal = NH+gALinA,
versus ATotal = I˙H+ g˙ALinA and dATotal = dIH+dgALinA. Upon performing classical reduction – taking out Lin to pass to a
tilded q˜ with just a H˜ on it, as per Fig 2 – there is no longer any DA-Hamiltonian/A-Hamiltonian/Hamiltonian distinction
here, though there does remain a distinction in smeared objects: Hsmear = NH versus Asmear = I˙H and dAsmear = dIH.
I also mention a set-back as regards the distinctiveness of the LMB relational approach (Hamiltonian Collapse problem).
In passing to the Hamiltonian formalism prior to quantization, a lot of LMB-relational versus nonrelational formalism
differences are ironed out [87]. Now both have sum-form total ((D)A)Hamiltonians whereas the actions were product-form
versus difference-form; moreover the objects of interest are Hamiltonians rather than the smeared objects that exhibit a ‘DA’
trichotomy. However, as we shall see in Secs 16-21, the LMB-relational ideas, if not precisely the same implementations of
these that occur at the classical level, can be recycled at the quantum level.
Alternative: Histories Theory holds that, instead of configurations being primary entities, it is histories that are the
primary entities. This amounts to supplanting Relationalism 3) with the consequences given in Sec 16.4.
12 Categorizing extension in anticipation of quantizing?
One possible motivation for this extension is that quantization can be formally understood as a (bad) functor, linking the
classical to the quantum-mechanical. I argue against this in a number of ways in Sec 19.
Categories (o,m) consist of objects o and morphisms m (the maps between the objects, m : o −→ o), obeying a
number of axioms (domain and codomain assignment, identity relations, associativity relations and book-keeping relations,
see e.g. [196, 185, 178] for details.)
Functors are then maps f : (o1,m1) −→ (o2,m2) that obey various further axioms concerning domain, codomain,
identity and action on composite morphisms.
By the above, while so far we have only been studying objects [Relationalism 3), Sec 12], but we should have also been
studying morphisms. In particular the morphisms corresponding to q are the so-called point transformations (p. 15 of [153])
Point: q −→ q. The morphisms of phase space are the canonical transformations Can: Phase −→ Phase.
I agree that momenta and Poisson brackets are part of the conception of this world. Thus I am not contesting the
passage to (T ∗(q),{ , }). However, I do at least consider resisting the suggestion that what mathematically preserves the
Poisson bracket should be the associated morphisms of this, due to the previous SSec’s argument of configuration variables
and momenta being operationally distinguishable. Thus it is questionable to take bracket preserving morphisms that do
not respect this physical insight. An alternative would be a rigged version RigPhase of the phase space that preserves this
distinction. Here, the q-first interpretation of this is that the Q’s are fundamental and each P then follows by conjugation and
only transforms on q are primarily meaningful Here, if the Q’s change, then the P’s follow suit by being the new conjugates,
without any extra freedom in doing so. Thus the morphisms of this are just Point again, the conjugate momenta being held to
follow whatever the coordinates are rather than having their own morphisms (this approach’s intent is to put configurations
first, so one should not be surprised at these and not the momenta having the primary transformation properties. See Fig 2
for the ensuing options.
As regards further involvement of categories, we shall see below that Perspecting and Propositioning, which are themselves
at least partly inter-related, lead toward Topos Theory, a Topos being a category armed with some extra structures that
make it behave much like the category of sets, Sets (see Sec 14 for more details).
13 Perspectival extension at the classical level
Rovelli uses relationalism in the sense of objects not being located in spacetime (or space) but being located with respect to
each other (though he does not develop this to the extent of the above LMB-A relational postulates). Rovelli and Crane have,
between them, put forward 4 perspectival postulates. Not all have substantial classical forms since some involve observers in
(something like) Quantum Theory. Thus there is a gap in my classical line-up of these.
I use Persp(q) to mean {all Subq ⊂ q}. ‘Parts’ [185] is a similar categorical concept; I do not use this name since it sounds
too much like partial (as in partial observable). For Sets, Parts is embodied by the notion of power set.
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Figure 2: The options without and with the involvement of a g. [Once a g is involved, manifestly temporally relational APhase and DAPhase
alternatives arise.
Moreover, in my own presentation, ‘all’ has the connotation ‘all physical’. E.g. in 2-d the subset comprising of the x-
component of one particle and the y-component of another lacks in physical significance as a combination; there are some
ways in which Rnd can be taken to remember its blockwise origin as {Rd}n .
One role for subconfigurations is in modelling records as localized subconfigurations of a single instant. Additionally, Histories
Theory has an obvious localized subhistories counterpart of this.
Perspectivalism 3) Rovelli’s partial observables [100, 109] implement the conceptually-desirable idea of physics being
about correlations as well as being regarded as freeing oneself from complete/Dirac observables (which are much harder
to find). The partial observables approach is contextual through requiring pairs of partial observables in order to extract
entirely physical information. This is a possible alternative to the Dirac or Kucharˇ treatments of observables that involves
considerably less structure-finding due to aiming to bypass rather than resolve the Problem of Observables. It is not however
clear exactly what objects to compute in this approach in order to investigate whether subsystems exhibit correlation, or
how a number of other aspects of the Problem of Time can be addressed via these [126, 127, 101].
Perspectivalism 4) Use anything as a time for anything else’s motion. This can be seen as a ‘Relationalism 7W)’
alternative to Relationalism 7) as regards how to abstract time from change; the W is for ‘weakened’. I point out its similarity
to ‘tot tempora quot motus’ (so many times as there are motions, which is the Scholastics’ view of Aristotle, see e.g. p 54 of
[129]. Thus I also term this view of time AMR time after Aristotle, Mach and Rovelli.
Note 1) Perspectivalism 3-4) both have underlying senses of ‘democracy’ and of ‘not needing to detailedly construct’, though
I argue against these in Secs 21 and 22 and in future works [94].
One should also take stock that a lot of uses of the word ‘relational’ in Ashtekar variables/LQG are what this article terms
‘perspectival’, which additionally explains a number of other senses in which the word ‘relational’ has been used over the
years and to some extent fits various of the uses together. Thus e.g. GR in general and the Ashtekar variables formulation do
have manifest many other senses of ‘relational’ outside of the more usually-ascribed perspectival ones. I note that the present
Ashtekar variables/LQG literature does not systematically apply LMB(-A) relationalism (though there is some evidence
for individual pieces of such thinking in various formalisms and techniques used). Doing so could give the subject further
conceptual awareness. More generally, the extent and manner of the combineability of the Rovelli, Crane and LMB(-A) types
of relationalism is an interesting one and LQG is a reasonable arena in which to study this question. The nature of the
Problem of Time facets and strategies covered in this article are generally relevant here too. I continue with this in [94].
14 Propositions in the classical context
Physics involves asking and answering questions, i.e. propositions and therefore some kind of propositional logic. As far as I
am aware, the idea that physics is questions which are equivalent to logic was first put forward by Mackey [155] (see also [140]
for suggestions of this for specific Problem of Time settings). [The relationalist will be interested here in those propositions
concerning tangible physics.] I view this as an interesting observer-centred idea that is worth considering whether to elevate
to a general physical principle. I term this ‘Mackey’s Principle’ Isham and Linden [140] previously used this line of thought
as a physical principle for Histories Theory; my new consideration is to speculate whether this is a general principle.)
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While this plays a bigger, more ambiguous, more subtle role at the quantum level (Sec 21), one can already consider it
at the classical level. From the q-centric perspective of Relationalism 3) or some s-centric extension, this is an extension to
Prop(Persp(s)), where Prop denotes the set of all possible physical propositions about s. I am not claiming my treatment
of this is exhaustive. (E.g. I will take ‘property’ to be an unproblematic word, for all that is not, see e.g. p. 67 of [171] for
more.) My point is that the general theory of questions involves, a priori, both nontrivial temporal content and nontrivial
atemporal content. Then in strategies in which one can in fact purge questions of temporal content, one’s remaining theory
should parallel the nontrivial atemporal content of questions, so in that sense the structure of the atemporal content of
questions is also important for this article.
Implementing Propositioning in at least quite general terms involves Topos Theory. (A topos is a category with three
extra structures: 1) finite limits and colimits 2) power objects and 3) a subobject classifier [185, 195]. This renders Topos
Theory a more advanced topic than Category Theory itself, possessing also has ties to geometry and to logic [195, 185, 167].)
These allow a topos to bear further similarities to Sets (the familiar category of sets) and Boolean logic pinned on that.
Then “constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to finding a representation in a topos of a certain formal language that
is attached to the system” [193] (see also [168]). This approach also renders regions of configuration space [or more generally
of s, Sub(s)] primary, rather than the points out of which one usually considers the regions to be constituted of.
At the classical level, Propositioning is implemented simply as Sets, with Boolean logic itself entering as subobject classifier.
One can consider this to be in terms of regions of configuration space or some extension s or Sub(s), with union, intersection
and complement playing the roles of AND, OR and NOT.
Classically, the situation is straightforward [193, 195]: one is to use Sets as one’s topos, which comes with the obvious
Boolean logic entering as subobject classifier. Propositions about configuration space regions fit well within this classical
scheme. This is based on quantities having values in (Borel) sets within some state space such as q or Phase. Open (or clopen:
simultaneously closed and open) subsets are used. One is considering maps from state objects in Σ to quantity-value objects
in R. Here, Σ is the linguistic precursor of s. There is a language which is independent of theory type (classical/quantum)
though R clearly does depend on this: the propositional language PL(s).
15 More general configurational relationalism
Finally, for further use at both the classical and quantum levels, I make this extension of the arbitrary g-frame method/best
matching procedure.
One builds up compound objects as bona fide combinations of one’s primary objects (tensor/bundle structure). This
applies to the relational action (‘Relationalism 4’), but also more generally as a ‘building up’ move, producing all of actions,
notions of distance, notions of information and correlation, and quantum operators. The actions in question are Jacobi or
Jacobi–Synge type actions.
g-act g-all move. Whilst g’s physical irrelevance can occasionally be directly implemented by g-independent objects, far
more usually one has to implement it indirectly via incorporating g-act, g-all pair of moves into the sequence of maps in
one’s build-up. This builds g-bundle objects/bibundle objects with one bundling involving g. Schematically, for continuous
or discrete isometries (or a mixture), this is a metric background invariantizing (MBI) map
MBI = Sg ◦Maps ◦
→
g O (46)
for whichever object O upon which g is able to act and whichever Maps render this into a physically-interesting combination
such as an action, a QM operator or one of the notions of distance/information/correlation of Sec 14 of [87]. See [87] for a
topological-level counterpart. This is a generalization of how one might go about implementing configurational relationalism.
That was done in Sec 6 and 7’s best matching via the ‘all’ being a variation and the act an infinitesimal continuous isometry.
However, the generalization also covers group-averaging (sum and divide by order is ‘all’, with ‘act’ being a suitable group
action), or the similar group-summing/group-integrating, or inf-taking (e.g. in Gromov–Hausdorff type constructions [175,
87]). And it is useable not only on actions, but also in the study of both classical and quantum notions of information,
notions of distance, in Halliwell-type class functions [93] (alongside combinations of these that form decoherence functionals
[145, 147]), and for the quantum operators in Sec 14.6.
g-act, g-all also plays a role as regards classical notions of distance and of information, for quantum operators [87] and
for class functions and decoherence functionals in histories/Halliwell-type approaches [93] (Halliwell-type approaches are
combined Histories-Semiclassical-Records approaches to the Problem of Time).
The above is all at the level of the configuration space metric; for brief discussion of topological relationalism, see [87].
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16 QM-Level relationalism
16.1 Outline of a quantization scheme for g-trivial theories
I consider the quantization scheme along the lines of Isham’s [162], which, whilst quite general, is by no means all-embracing.
I take this to consist of the following steps as composed in Fig 3.
Select is the selection of a set of classical objects that are to be promoted to quantum operators, alongside passing from
the classical Poisson brackets to some commutation relations, algebra ComAl. It is very obvious in the simplest example:
qA −→ q̂A, pA −→ p̂A alongside the usual (‘correspondence principle’)
from {qA,pB} = δAB to [q̂A , p̂B] = i~δAB . (47)
However, in general it exhibits a number of subtleties [162]. More generally, ComAl := (a chosen set of f(q̂, p̂) alongside a
bracket structure). Here, one has to in general make a choice of a preferred subalgebra of Phase objects [162] to promote to
QM operators.
Assoc then associates a pre-Hilbert space PreHilb of pre-wavefunctions for these operators to act on.
KinQuant:= Select ◦ Assoc is kinematical quantization.
H-rep is how to promote the Hamiltonian H to a function Ĥ of KinQuant’s operators, yielding a wave equation.
HSolve is then solving this: passing from PreHilb to Hilb: the Hilbert space within that is annihilated by Ĥ. Note that
Hilb’s inner product restricts what are valid operators by self-adjointness.
DynQuant := HSolve ◦ HRep, the dynamical quantization.
Quant := DynQuant ◦ KinQuant is, finally, this approach’s basic notion of quantization. N.B. as formally defined here, this
acts on a triple such as (Phase, Can, H) or (RigPhase, Point, H).
Figure 3: Breakdown of a simple quantization scheme in the absense of redundancies.
16.2 Relational properties at the quantum level
Tangibility, temporal relationalism and configurational relationalism ideas remain relevant in the quantum arena. However,
implementations are different now, for at the classical level these were implemented at the level of actions, whereas in
Quantum Theory there usually are no actions.14
One widespread and simple implementation of tangibility at the quantum level is to ultimately consider not wavefunctions
or operators Ô but rather combinations 〈ψ1|Ô|ψ2〉 (which include as subcases expectations: ψ1 = ψ2, and overlap integrals
Ô = id).
16.3 Temporal relationalism at the quantum level: from Leibniz to the Frozen Formalism
I note that ordinary QM itself is not Leibniz-timeless. It is whole-universe QM that is, at least at first glance at conventional
forms for its equations. In more detail, temporal relationalism ⇒ MPI actions ⇒ homogeneous quadratic constraint H ⇒ at
the quantum level the
Frozen Formalism Facet of the Problem of Time, i.e. that one has a timeless wave equation ĤΨ = 0, in contradistinction
from such as a time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation i∂ψ/∂t = ĤΨ, Klein–Gordon equation 2ψ = 4ψ − ∂ttψ = m2ψ or
Dirac equation i{γtAB∂tψB − γµAB}∂µψB = mψA.15
Each of the latter set of equations are common in ordinary QM but entail absolute time notions (whether Newtonian in the
first example or Minkowskian in the other two).
14There are, however, still actions within which one can implement temporal relationalism as MPI in path integral approaches to Quantum
Theory and, furthermore, in Histories Theory approaches to the Problem of Time.
15Here, I use ψ as wavefunction versus Ψ as wavefunction of the universe. ψB is a Dirac spinor and γΓAB are Dirac matrices.
23
Note also how in the relational approach the Frozen Formalism facet readily follows from the Leibniz temporal relationalism
principle, rather than coming as a surprise or being considered to arise from MRI, which is, in the LMB-relational approach,
not an explanatory principle but, rather a mathematical implementation of the actual Leibniz time principle.
The Problem of Time [126, 127, 130, 87, 131] occurs because ‘time’ takes a different meaning in each of GR and ordinary
Quantum Theory. This incompatibility underscores a number of problems with trying to replace these two branches with a
single framework in situations in which the premises of both apply, such as in black holes or the very early universe. Other
Problem of Time facets are introduced below.
16.4 Frozen Formalism Facet resolutions and Mach’s time principle
There are approaches to QG in which time is not primary [thus implementing Leibniz’s Relationalism 5)] but which then
have an emergent time or a semblance of time arising at the quantum level. Note how Mach provides a suggestion for how to
resolve timelessness. Variants of the Mach time principle are discussed in Secs 5.10, 9.7, the Conclusion, and [94, 131]. The
last three of these references permit finer Machian assessment of Problem of Time strategies than are given below. I next
analyze the usual set of Problem of Time strategies from a simple Machian time perspective.
A) Perhaps one is to find a hidden time at the classical level [126] by performing a canonical transformation under which the
quadratic constraint is sent to
pthidden + Htrue = 0 (48)
(for pthidden the momentum conjugate to some new coordinate t
hidden that is a candidate timefunction). This is then promoted
to a thidden-dependent Schro¨dinger equation,
i~∂Ψ/∂thidden = ĤtrueΨ . (49)
Particular cases of this are as follows.
A.1) Scale as internal time.
A.2) Superspace time [126, 127] is a further variant on this, following from the scale contribution giving the indefiniteness in
GR kinetic term, a feature not found elsewhere in physics and which causes a number of difficulties. (E.g. invalidation of
the usual Schro¨dinger interpretation of the inner product, and a whole new theory for the dynamical meaning of zeros in the
potential factor.)
However, scale fails to be globally monotonic in general and the superspace time approach fails due to the GR potential term
being incompatible with the GR kinetic term’s conformal Killing vector.
A.3) York time (the conjugate of a particular scale variable). However, for this the practical scheme breaks down, and the
split of hµν into embedding and true degrees of freedom has a global impasse.
A.4) Matter appended to the geometrodynamics might provide a timefunction (matter time).
As criticisms of approach A) in general, this is not in line with Leibniz timelessness (since the time in use is taken to a
priori exist in general at the classical level: Tempus Ante Quantum [127]), nor with the LMB-type take on Mach’s time
principle, since it involves using one particular change as the time for all the other changes. Moreover, matter time schemes
themselves are typically additionally suspect along the lines of intangibility, via often involving such as ‘reference fluids’, and
often endowed with unphysical properties to boot. [The intangibility might be taken as cover for the unphysicality, but is
itself a conceptually suspect way of handling the Problem of Time along the lines exposited in the present article.]
JBB time itself is Tempus ante Quantum, but is now classically emergent and thus in line with Leibniz-timelessness and
the LMB stance on Mach’s time principle. One particular scheme for this has it arise to zeroth approximation from slow
heavy h degrees of freedom, to which light fast l degrees of freedom then contribute to first order; see below for physical
discussion of the nature of h and l degrees of freedom. On the other hand, this approach does not gives a Frozen Formalism
resolution. However, we shall see it is approximately recovered by the next entry, which does provide a Frozen Formalism
resolution.
B) Perhaps instead there is no time in general but a notion of time does emerge under certain circumstances. The most notable
example of this is the Semiclassical Approach. Here, one has slow heavy ‘h’ variables that provide an approximate times-
tandard with respect to which the other fast light ‘l’ degrees of freedom evolve [132, 133, 126, 43]. In the Halliwell–Hawking
[133] scheme for GR Quantum Cosmology, h is scale (and homogeneous matter modes) and l are small inhomogeneities. h–l
alignment with scale–shape removes ambiguity of how to allot h and l roles.
The semiclassical approach involves making the Born–Oppenheimer ansatz Ψ(h, l) = ψ(h)|χ(h, l)〉 and the WKB ansatz
ψ(h) = exp(iW (h)/~). Next, one forms the h-equation (〈χ|ĤΨ = 0 for RPM’s), which, under a number of simplifications,
yields a Hamilton–Jacobi16 equation
{∂W/∂h}2 = 2{E− V(h)} (50)
for V(h) the h-part of the potential. Next, one way of solving this is for an approximate emergent semiclassical time
tem = tem(h). Finally, the l-equation {1− |χ〉〈χ|}ĤΨ = 0 can be recast (modulo further approximations) into an emergent-
16For simplicity, I present this in the case of 1 h degree of freedom and with no linear constraints.
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time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation for the l degrees of freedom,
i~∂|χ〉/∂tem = Ĥl|χ〉 . (51)
(Here the left-hand side arises from the cross-term ∂h|χ〉∂hψ and Ĥl is the piece of Ĥ that survives). Note that the working
leading to such a time-dependent wave equation ceases to work in the absense of making the WKB ansatz and approximation,
which, additionally, in the quantum-cosmological context, is not known to be a particularly strongly supported ansatz and
approximation to make.
Then the scale part contributes an approximate timestandard with respect to which the shape part runs according to
usual positive-definite kinetic term physics (‘scale-indefiniteness alignment’ exploited by aligning h with both). This can then
be fed into more promising Histories-Records-semiclassical combination strategies.
Note that the identification of the t is unambiguous if one uses scale = h and shape = l split. This puts that ‘cursed’
heterogeneity to a use – it is the cure to approximate time selection in cosmological models. Need to see the crudest estimate
of t here is not very Machian, but the corrected version does allow for l-changes to contribute too, thus rendering it very
Machian.
Overall, emergent semiclassical time is Machian once back-reaction of the l-system on the chroniferous h-system is incorpo-
rated. This is qualitatively similar to the emergent JBB time scheme at the classical level.
C) A number of approaches take timelessness at face value. The most natural follow-on for Relationalism 3) is the ‘Tempus
nihil est’ postulate. One considers only questions about the universe ‘being’, rather than ‘becoming’, a certain way. Consid-
ering physical questions about a system amounts to an algebra of propositions; this is implemented by regions or, better, by
projectors at QM level. Particular versions of timeless approaches that enter this article’s discussions are as follows.
C.I) the Na¨ıve Schro¨dinger Interpretation [134, 135] concerns the ‘being’ probabilities for universe properties, such as ‘what
is the probability that the universe is flat?’ One obtains these via consideration of the probability that the universe belongs
to region R of the configuration space that corresponds to a quantification of a particular such property,
Prob(R) ∝
∫
R
|Ψ|2dΩ , (52)
for dΩ the configuration space volume element.
C.II) The Conditional Probabilities Interpretation [99] goes further by addressing conditioned questions of ‘being’ such as
‘what is the probability that the universe is flat given that it is isotropic’?
C.III) Records Theory [99, 136, 138, 27, 143, 58] involves localized subconfigurations of a single instant. More concretely, it
concerns whether these contain useable information, are correlated to each other, and a semblance of dynamics or history
arises from this. [I do not use emergence and semblance as synonyms.] This requires notions of localization in space and
in configuration space as well as notions of information; in fact, this article adds to existing criteria as regards specifying a
mathematically-precise Records Theory. There is trickery to reduce temporal logic to atemporal logic [58], and ID itself is
then a fine study of atemporal logic (though this Records-Theoretic application of ID is, as far as I know, new to the present
article).
Analysis of attitudes to time permits classification of the times that arise from timeless approaches. This involves Na¨ıve
Schro¨dinger Interpretation, Conditional Probabilities Interpretation, Page, Barbour, Gell-Mann–Halliwell and Hartle Records,
my records, the combined approaches of Halliwell [145, 147] and of Gambini–Porto–Pullin [107, 110, 111, 112], alongside
extensions of these that include notions of observables/beables [93, 113], and also the Rovelli approach, as well as suggesting
a number of further hybrid programs, and is to be covered in more depth in a subsequent paper [94].
D) Perhaps instead it is the histories that are primary (Histories Theory [136, 141]); this is an alternative to ‘q is primary’ or
‘phase space is primary’. More generally, I note that temporal relationalism is implemented via MRI into suitable formulations
in terms of path integrals. Additionally, one can use emergent JBB/semiclassical time to formulate Histories Theory.
16.5 Outline of a quantization scheme for g-nontrivial, classically-unreduced theories
Barbour-relationalism’s indirect implementation at the classical level gives constraints Quad and Lin. The reduced/
relationalspace r-scheme gives a constraint Q˜uad. Both these schemes are relational, thus Dirac and reduced schemes are
both relational. In the preceding literature, Barbour, Rovelli and Smolin [20] had largely not considered the LMB brand of
relationalism along the above lines beyond the general idea that Dirac Quantization is an indirect scheme that implements
configurational relationalism. Barbour had on the other hand considered a timeless records approach [22, 27] which has some
relational features.
[87] used the g-act, g-all method for Timeless Records Theory, and [93] used it along the lines of Halliwell’s combined
approach.
Methods such as the group integration approach (essentially a variant/particular implementation of the Dirac quantiza-
tion approach) are fairly widely used in LQG (e.g. in the Master Constraint program [190, 189]). In this sense, LQG is
configurationally relational at the quantum level.
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Figure 4: Breakdown of a simple quantization scheme in the presence of a group g of physically-redundant transformations. a) The Dirac-type
scheme. b) The reduced-type scheme.
In this more general setting [Fig 4.a)], Quant := DynQuant ◦ g-Quant ◦ KinQuant.
g-Quant := g-Solve ◦ g-Rep, each of which individual steps is defined in obvious parallel to H-Rep and H-Solve. g-Solve
sends PreHilb to MidHilb, standing for ‘middlingly physical Hilbert space’.
I also define C-Rep = H-Rep ◦ g-Rep (these maps commute), and C-Solve = H-Solve ◦ g-Solve. These are particularly
useful in approaches that do not discriminate between linear and quadratic constraints.
16.6 Outline of a quantization scheme for reduced theories
Reduced-type formulations also embody configurational relationalism. These are essentially tilded versions of Fig 3, available
whenever one has the good fortune to, at the classical level, beable to directly formulate or reduce away all the redundancies
from the indirect formulation. This is covered in Fig 4b) and amounts to a tilde-ing of Fig 3 (itself following on from the
classical reduction diagram of Fig 1).
16.7 A further element of configurational relationalism at the quantum level
QM makes use of further operators. Group averaging/refined algebraic quantization looks to be a good quantum implemen-
tation of configurational relationalism. Given a non-configurationally-relational operator Ô,∫
g
exp
(
i
∑
Z
→
ggZ
)
Ô exp
(
−i
∑
Z
→
ggZ
)
Dg (53)
(for ggZ the action of infinitesimal generators) is a relational counterpart, which is another example of g-act, g-all procedure
based on the exponentiated adjoint group action followed by integration over the group. One can do similarly to pass from
non-configurationally relational states to configurationally-relational ones. Admittedly, there are well-definedness issues in
general as regards the measure Dg over the group g. In particular, treating the diffeomorphisms in this way is problematic.
See Sec 14 of [87] for further discussion.
16.8 Composing configurational and temporal relationalism at the quantum level
Configurational relationalism is linked to a number of further Problem of Time facets. Although specific properties of the
diffeomorphisms are very important, quite a few features of the Problem of Time follow from relationalism alone rather than
additional insistence of g containing (more or less) Diff(3).
Best Matching Problem. I discussed in Sec 9.5 how this is the generalization and configurational-relational conceptual-
ization of the usually so-called thin sandwich problem. It is usually taken to be a classical facet of the Problem of Time,
though additionally Sec 9.5’s set-up of the thin sandwich set-up is in analogy with the QM set-up of transition amplitudes
between states at two different times; this was indeed Wheeler’s original motivation for it [7].
Functional Evolution Problem. This concerns anomalies in the quantum commutator algebra, i.e. the further quantum
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counterpart of Relationalism 10). More specifically, a subset of anomalies are time-related e.g. through the anomalous terms
being foliation-dependent.
Problem of Observables. This, and its resolutions, are as stated at the classical level in Sec 9.4 but now involving quantum
objects and commutator algebra in place of Poisson brackets algebra.
Global Problem of Time. Quantum mechanically, this is rather more involved than the classical meshing condition, now
being some kind of largely unexplored statement about meshing together not of coordinate systems but of unitary quantum
evolutions.
Multiple Choice Problem This is partly due to coordinate choices (which the Global Problem of Time’s need for multiple
coordinate patches compounds), or due to choices of functions to promote to an operator algebra (see Sec 18). It then manifests
itself at the quantum level in the form of different choices being capable of leading to unitarily-inequivalent quantum theories.
These last two facets are not particularly LMB relational; we shall see, however that they are at least partially RC relational.
Once one’s g includes diffeomorphisms, the Foliation Dependence Problem arises as a further possible source of back-
ground dependence (which would be in discord with LMB relationalism) and there is also rather more of a Spacetime
Reconstruction/Replacement Problem than in Sec 9.7’s classical treatment.
17 Examples of relational theories at the quantum level
17.1 Indirect presentation of RPM triangleland
Here, the frozen wave equation is
ÊΨ = −~
2
2
δαβδij
∂
∂ρiα
∂
∂ρjδ
Ψ + V (ρkγ)Ψ = EΨ (54)
summed from 1 to 3 in i,j and 1 to 2 in µ, alongside the quantum zero total angular momentum equation
L̂Ψ = ~
i
∑
3
i = 1
ρi ×
∂
∂ρi
Ψ = 0 , (55)
This working, unlike that of the next SSec, readily generalizes to all dimensions and particle numbers. Here, Ψ is the
wavefunction of the (model) universe. RPM Dirac-QM study was developed in [20, 49, 87].
Note 1) relational triangleland cannot distinguish between dimensions 2 and 3; in [87] I used this to argue that dimension is
not an a priori given in RPM’s.
Note 2) g-Quant restricts the AM quantum numbers of the base and apex subsystems to counterbalance each other [49],
thus causing a substantial collapse in the physically admissible spectrum of states for this theory.
As regards the indirect definition of rotation-averaged operators, triangleland’s SO(2) = U(1) is a particularly simple case,
for which ∫
g∈g
Dg =
∫
ω∈S1
Dω =
∫ 2pi
ω=0
dω (56)
and
→
gg is the infinitesimal 2-d rotation action via the matrix Rω acting on the vectors of the model. ω is here the absolute
rotation.
Note 1) clearly (54) exhibits the Frozen Formalism Facet of the Problem of Time.
Note 2) RPM’s exhibit no Functional Evolution Problem nor have any place for discussions of foliations or of GR-like
spacetime reconstruction, thus evading two further Problem of Time Facets. They clearly do exhibit the other Problem of
Time facets.
17.2 Direct r-presentation of scaled RPM triangleland
Direct r-QM study for RPM’s was developed in [62, 66, 70, 71, 65, 75, 87, 97]. Looking at specific simple solvable examples
such as in these last 2 SSecs, I find (contrary to suggestions in e.g. [27]) a lack of non-standard QM. By this standardness
of the actual mathematics involved (just new relational meanings for well-known equations and special functions), plenty
of machinery is available for solving, and performing further calculations with, simple examples of quantum RPM’s. Note
however that these models are appropriate as whole-universe models and for detailed analysis of the Problem of Time.
Thus this coincidence is a triumph as regards finding tractable toy models for the investigation of closed-universe questions
(Problem of Time, foundations of Quantum Cosmology...)
For scaled triangleland, the frozen wave equation is
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HΨ = −~
2
2
{
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I2
{
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{
I2
∂Ψˇ
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}
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1
sinΘ
∂Ψˇ
∂Θ
{
sinΘ
∂Ψˇ
∂Θ
}
+
1
sin2Θ
∂2Ψˇ
∂Φ2
}}
Ψ + V˘ = E˘Ψ . (57)
Note 1) Some differences between absolutist and relational QM are as follows (these are well understandable from within
the usual kind of a mathematical framework for Quantum Theory). There are differences of the subsystem versus the closed
whole-system sort between absolutist QM and relational QM Subsystem physics in a relational universe would be expected
to be linked by global restrictions due to its constraint equations. Such differences were already found to be present in the
GR case by DeWitt [98]. There is no a priori time, but many parts of QM do not depend on time, and [87] explains how the
remaining parts can be accessed using emergent time dependent wave equations.
Note 2) As regards the remaining Problem of Time facets for RPM’s, in 1- and 2-d, the Best Matching problem is resolved (by
the reduction process itself!) Also, the Kucharˇ observables are known [89] and geometrically natural, and Dirac observables
can then be constructed along the lines of [93], so the Problem of Observables is here well under control.
17.3 The Dirac scheme for geometrodynamics
ĤΨ := −~2‘
{
1√
M
δ
δhµν
{√
MNµνρσ
δΨ
δhρσ
}
− ξRic(h;M]
}
’ Ψ−
√
hRic(x;h]Ψ +
√
h2ΛΨ = 0 , and (58)
Hµ := −2Dνpiνµ = 0 which becomes, at the quantum level, ĤµΨ := −2DρhρνδΨ/δhµν = 0 . (59)
The latter implements configurational relationalism, signifying that the wavefunction of the universe is to be a function of
the 3-geometry alone.
Whilst classical GR had its constraint algebra close and the refoliation invariance property by Notes 1) and 2) of Sec 9.4,
there are no known corresponding results at the quantum level, constituting the Functional Evolution Problem and Foliation
Dependence Problem facets of the Problem of Time.
17.4 Comments on LQG and its Dirac-type quantization scheme
One now has a new reformulation of the quadratic constraint and of the momentum constraint, alongside a new linear SU(2)-
Yang–Mills constraint that reflects the extra degeneracy of the presentation’s g = Diff(3) ×SU(2). The loop representation
takes back this last degeneracy, whilst considering and knots formally uses up the Diff(3) constraint too. This amounts to
performing the g-Quant steps of a Dirac-type approach.
I also comment that one source of good names for physical programs that purport to be relational and thus concern
tangible entities, is to name the theories after the tangible entities rather than after convenient but meaningless parts of
the formalism that happen to be in use in the mathematical study of that theory. By this criterion, ‘geometrodynamics’
and ‘shape theory’ [29]/‘dynamics of pure shape’ [38, 41]/‘shape dynamics’ [78] are very good relational names, whereas the
name ‘Loop Quantum Gravity’ (LQG) leaves quite a lot to be desired from a relational perspective. For, in this program
the SU(2) gauge group is put in by hand with the particular choice of spinor/bein variables that happen to simplify GR’s
canonical formalism. It is only the subsequent removal of its significance that brings loops into the program’s formalism, but
the lion’s share of the work in any canonical quantum GR program resides, rather, in removing Diff(Σ) and in interpreting
the Hamiltonian constraint. Even without the ‘put in by hand’ issue, the parallel naming for RPM’s would be ‘sphere theory’
or ‘sphere dynamics’ from this being the form the preshape space takes before the lion’s share of the work is done in removing
Rot(d) (and, in the dynamics case, interpreting the energy-type constraint). But this is rather clearly not enlightening naming
because the preshape space spheres do not play a deep conceptual role in shape theory. As such, I would suggest names
along the lines of ‘Knot Quantum Gestalt’ or ‘quantum nododynamics’. This is also particularly appropriate via the Gestalt
conceptualization of GR being, at least at the level of metric structure, very much emphasized in the ‘LQG’ program itself,
just not in the LQG program’s name.
Thiemann’s alternative name ‘Quantum Spin Dynamics (QSD)’ is somewhat confuseable with such as the Ising model
and its ilk, and also the spin connotations come from the SU(2) gauge groups. On the other hand, letting the S stand for
‘spin-net’ disambiguates the nature of the theory, though a spin-net still does have but a similar ontological status to a loop.
Taking relational primality further, then, the final suggestion is that the S should stand for S-knot (spin-knot).
A useful further project would be to provide a LMB(-A) relational account of the quantum part of Thiemann’s book [192]
(and of other schemes for modern LQG, there being a variety of such schemes).
18 Extending primality of q to QM?
QM q-Primality Motivation 1) On the one hand, one often hears that QM unfolds on configuration space, on the other hand
most hold that it unfolds equally well on whichever polarization within phase space, of which configuration space is but one.
QM q-Primality Motivation 2) I note that Isham’s procedure [162] for kinematic quantization itself favours q: the canonical
group comes from just this and then the v is controlled by q and its associated g and gcan so everything is controlled by
configuration space too.
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QM q-Primality Motivation 3) I expect then also for Point to be relevant to Pre-Hilbert space, and for the operator-orderings
of the constraints likewise. This enables a connection with a conjecture of DeWitt concerning operator-ordering in Chapter
6 of [87].
Note 1) This Sec’s somewhat outlandish suggestion is not the only possible reason behind Motivations 2 and 3; indeed if Can
plays a role, Can is an enlargement of Point, and Point is then the ‘Can that act on MAB(Q
C)’ restriction, which suffices to
cover DeWitt’s issue.
Note 2) (RigPhase, Point), as classically motivated in Sec 11 and argued to be a sensible implementation of q-primality, has
the same objects and brackets as (Phase, Can) and hence the same KinQuant. But in restricting Can to Point as morphisms
preserving Poisson brackets and the rigging, then ComAl’s morphisms would likewise be restricted. A possible problem with
this view is that QM’s P’s and Q’s may be more alike than their classical counterparts.
QM q-Primality Motivation 4) A further reason to question the licitness of all canonical transformations is that classical
equivalence under canonical transformations is in general broken in the passage to QM as per e.g. the Groenewold–Van
Hove phenomenon [152, 154]. Moreover, the Groenewold–Van Hove theorem continues to apply in the RigPhase approach,
since one can envisage choosing Q3 and P 3 there instead of Q and P . Thus, whilst RigPhase is an illustration of weakening
the canonical transformations, it is not the correct weakening to take into account Gronewold–Van Hove; I leave as an
open question what the set of canonical transformations that do become unitary transformations at the quantum level is
characterized by.
Note 2) Using just Point does not resolve out all aspects of unitary inequivalence, though it may help/may be a step in the
right direction. A deeper question is which weakening of the Can’s or Point’s at the classical level form up into classes that
are preserved as unitary equivalence at the quantum level. (RigPhase, Point) itself is at the bottom of the hierarchy, whereas
the solution of the currently posed problem is likely to involve a rather larger proportion of the canonical transformations.
Consequences of using RigPhase in place of Phase are as follows. Holding canonical transformations in doubt affects Internal
Time and Histories Theory approaches to the Problem of Time, as well as Ashtekar variables and the recent Linking Theory
approach [74, 76, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86]. The second and fourth of these make more than the usual amount of use of canonical
transformations; this Sec suggests, moreover, the possibility of developing physics in the opposite direction.
Histories primality alternative Further reasons for Histories Theory appear at the QM level [141, 148]. This follows on
from the path integral perspective, and additionally represents various modified interpretations of QM that are more suitable
in the whole-universe context.
19 Arguments against quantization in term of functoriality
I analyze these by ‘taking this functor apart’ into various simpler constituents as per Figs 3 and 4. A number of these steps
already have individual difficulties.
Two reasons for the KinQuant functor to be ‘bad’ (or, at least, ambiguous) are 1) preferred subalgebra choice (and the
nontriviality thereof by e.g. Groenewold–Van Hove and 2) global considerations.
3) A further reason for badness is anomalies arising in the passage from the Poisson brackets algebra to the commutator
algebra.
4) In the case of H-rep for geometrodynamics, there are also well-definedness issues (functional derivatives, combinations
with no functional-analytic reasons to be well-behaved) and regularization issues.
5) On top of these individual difficulties, the order in which some of these procedures are performed affects the outcome
(e.g. reduce and then conformal-order does not match up with conformal-order and then reduce); this is covered in detail in
Chapter 6 of [87].
This bad functor conclusion, if not all the details of why, matches with Baez’s [180] point of view, which was probably arrived
at considering other/more quantization approaches than Isham 1984.
A different line of objection to quantization itself is that it is only desirable in the incipient parts of conceiving a quantum
theory (so it is tied to an understood classical theory, but QM is more fundamental so one needs to pass to first principles
Quantum Theory which one then has the sometimes fatal hope of recovery of a recognized classical limit). [For some
particular examples, the functor does work out, but the above demonstrates that for suitably general theories there is not at
all a standard prescription for quantizing, and formatting this as a functor does not in any way help with that.]
Moreover, further and distinct use of categories in quantization are as follows.
Option 1) quantizing other categories - treating their objects as one usually treats q. An simple example of this is in some
Histories Theory work, in which one considers the ‘history brackets’ of histories and their conjugate momenta [140].
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More general Example 1). This is how Isham [184] considered quantization on quite general categories, with the
morphisms/arrows now playing the role of momenta.
20 Perspectival postulates at the QM level
Localized subconfigurations furthermore play an underlying role in Crane’s thinking [103]. This involves the following
postulate (my nomenclature).
Perspectivalism 1) Quantum Theory ONLY makes sense for subsystems (my caps).
In the quantum GR arena, Crane deals with this by considering splits of the universe with the observer residing on the surface
of that split.17 Each of these splits then has its own Hilbert space. Crane then maintains that the whole universe has no
Hilbert space (so his version of what I term Persp(q) has ⊂ in place of my ⊂), though a Hilbert space is to be recovered in
a semiclassical limit.
I dissect this as follows due to not agreeing will all parts of it.
Crane 1) QM makes sense for subsystems (true, and obvious); each has its own Hilbert space, within which the standard
interpretation of QM applies.
Crane 2) Almost all QM concerns subsystems (true at an elementary level, but sometimes forgotten in Quantum Cosmology).
Crane 3) What would be QM for the whole universe does not possess a Hilbert space or the standard interpretation of QM.
A–Crane Difference 1) Here I disagree about the lack of Hilbert space (shrunken as it may be due to closed-universe effects
as per Secs 7 and 10), but agree about the subsequent non-applicability of the standard interpretation (though this is well
known and plenty of different groups of authors have been willing to work under such conditions). That is why I use ⊂
and not ⊂; this difference also accounts for my replacing ‘all’ by ‘almost’. I envisage the scalefactor of the universe as a
possible whole-universe property that can plausibly enter one’s physical propositions; at the very least, scale is not a localized
subsystem.
A–Crane Difference 2) Finally, Crane did not stipulate his Subq to carry the same local physical connotations as mine (as
per Sec 14.1.1).
Crane 4) QM makes sense for the universe as a whole in some kind of semiclassical limit. Here I agree with Crane, though
in detail we may well not both mean exactly the same thing by a ‘semiclassical limit’. Moreover Crane 4) is less necessary
from my perspective (it applies just to interpretation, rather than to the possession of a Hilbert space as well).
Perspectivalism 1W) (W for ‘weakened’) is the name by which I shall refer to my above version [Crane 1, 2) and my side of
A-Crane Differences 1, 2)].
Note 1) Perspectivalism 1W) is what I posit as the perspectival expansion of Relationalism 3) [though one could instead elect
to use Perspectivalism 1) in such a role].
Note 2) Whilst I have no evidence for such a connection, I comment that on the one hand one has multiplicity by inequivalent
quantum theories and on the other hand multiplicity by multiple observer perspectives. Are there ever any connections
between these two multiplicities?
Perspectivalism 2) allows for the QM of observers observing other observers observing subsystems. This provides
a further level of structure between the plethora of Hilbert spaces associated with all the perspectives of Perspectivalism 1).
This approach contends that [104] QM propositions only makes sense in the context of particular observers (my
rewording). (This has no nontrivial classical counterpart.)
Note 3) In RPM’s, the perspectival approach can be toy-modelled using the notion of a localized fictitious test-observers
who can measure nearby inter-particle distances and perhaps relative angles about their particular position, archetypes being
considering the base subsystem of a triangleland or the base alongside the relative angle (the ‘fictitious test-observer more
or less at the centre of mass of a localized binary’). This can accommodate Perspectivalism 1) to some extent, but cannot
meaningfully incorporate Perspectivalism 2) which explicitly requires non-negligibility of observer material properties.
Note 4) The Crane set-up then involves ‘the entire set of SubQuant’s’, with Perspectivalism 2 necessitating yet further
structure beyond that, as well as nontrivial modelling of observers as quantum systems [an idea nobody can really calculate
with, which also features in the thinking of Page [142, 144] and of Hartle [146]; the state of the art here is Hartle’s information
gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) model for observers [146, 148].
My preceding SSec makes the possible advance that ‘the entire set’ requires physical Subq’s rather than the greater mathe-
matical generality of Subq’s, and that it is additionally contingent on a definition of localization in space to be obeyed as a
17In fact, Crane [102] defines the observer to be such a boundary of a localized region, though I caution that not all boundaries will have
actual observers upon them and that sizeable boundaries would need to be populated by many observers, forming ‘shells of observers’/an array
of detectors. I also note that, at least as far as I can tell, Crane’s view (and Rovelli’s less specific one [104]) of observers both strip them of any
connotations of animateness or manifestly capacitated for processing information. I term this the introspective implementation, as it involves a
shell of inward-looking observers.
30
further practical consideration in the selection of a set. I add that these desirable features would not appear to be conducive
to the implementing sets being mathematically simple; the notion of localization in space in particular would introduce a
source of ambiguity into the model: how local and by what criterion.
The concepts embodied by Perspectivalism 3) and 4) carry over straightforwardly to the quantum level. A form of Per-
spectivalism 4) purely at the QM level had previously been proposed by Page and Wootters [99], and this position (if not
accompanying technical details) was also taken up by Gambini–Porto–Pullin [108, 110].
21 Quantum Propositioning
Represent propositions at the quantum level by projectors is a key move. In ordinary Quantum Theory, for state ρ and
proposition P implemented by projector P̂, Prob(P ; ρ) = tr(ρ̂P̂) with Gleason’s theorem providing strong uniqueness criteria
for this choice of object from the perspective of satisfying the basic axioms of probabilities (see e.g. [171]). Furthermore,
in some approaches to the Problem of Time, one goes beyond [140] the usual context and interpretation that are ascribed
to projectors in ordinary Quantum Theory. Propositions were used from the inception in the Conditional Probabilities
Interpretation [99]. Desiring a projector implementation of propositions led to Isham and Linden’s reformulation of Histories
Theory. The Records Theory within Histories Theory is, more trivially, satisfactory from the perspective of having its
propositions represented by projectors. On the other hand, the Na¨ıve Schro¨dinger Interpretation and Halliwell approaches
are still using configuration space regions rather than proposition-projector association [87, 93]. Prima facie, this is suspect.
Moreover, one might be able to pin a topos-type interpretation on such practises (though this has indeed not been worked
out yet).
One possible more general mathematical implementation of propositioning is in Isham–Doering (ID)-type approaches
[193, 195] to using Topos Theory in physics provides a large amount of candidate structure as regards realizing Prop(s) at
the quantum level. Quantum-mechanically, there are distributivity issues with the logic, insofar as quantum logic [137] is
not distributive. However, alternatively, internal logic, which ID term ‘intuitionistic logic’ [179, 193, 194, 195] may be more
applicable than quantum logic, and this is now distributive again. Given a state, truth values are assigned to all propositions
about the quantum system, in which sense this is a neo-realist approach. N.B. this is independent of measurements/observers;
this is to be compared with the Crane-type characterization of subsystems in terms of boundary observers (Sec 15) in Sec
16.6.
In fact, the ID study has 2 languages at the quantum level: as well as the propositional language PL(s), it has a higher-order
typed language, L(s). The propositional language is simpler and more directly related to standard quantum logic. However,
standard quantum logic comes with various problems, so that being an intuitionistic logic distinct from standard quantum
logic is an advantageous feature of L(s) [as opposed to PL(s)].
Here, there is a map that maps projectors to subobjects of the spectral presheaf, which is the QM analogue of a classical
state space.18 Moreover, the topos perspective itself favours the higher-order language L(s) as the natural kind of language
that can be represented in a topos; it is ‘internal’ to it.
Note 1) This approach does require radical revision of QM itself [193, 195], amounting to avoiding the obstruction in standard
QM due to the Kochen–Specker theorem.
Note 2) The logic role played in classical physics by the Boolean algebra is played more generally in QM-relevant topoi by
a Heyting algebra [195] (this and the Boolean algebra are both distributive lattices, the difference being that the Heyting
Algebra has no law of the excluded middle).
Note 3) Implementing propositions in this fashion is more sophisticated than the Na¨ıve Schro¨dinger Interpretation or Hal-
liwell’s combined approach, for which one does so by thinking about classical regions that have limitations as regards
implementing the entirety of QM propositions and relations between them.
Note 4) QM ends up involving the topos SetsV (H)
op
, i.e. the topos of contravariant (‘opposite’) valued functors on the poset
category V (H) of commutative subalgebras of the algebra of bounded operators on the Hilbert space of the system, H.
22 Conclusion
This article concerned relationalism. I contrasted and composed the very different LMB (Leibniz–Mach–Barbour) and RC
(Rovelli–Crane) uses of this word. Moreover, I argued strongly that relationalism is relevant to background independence
and that background independence is an important part of many of the leading ‘Quantum Gravity’ programs, to the extent
that I took QG to stand, rather, for Quantum Gestalt. This refers to the Relativistic Gravity–Background Independence
Gestalt as exemplified by GR (taken to be not only a set of relativistic field equations for gravitation, but also a philosophical
perspective about freeing physics of background structures held by Einstein among others). Finally, I argued that Background
18A presheaf is a mathematical implementation of the idea of attaching local data to a structure; as such it ought to be of considerable interest
in Records Theory and in Histories Theory, for all that hitherto these have been modelled with more (metric) structure.
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Independence is wont to lead to many of the facets of the Problem of Time, so that valuing Background Independence means
having to, among other concerns, face up to this conceptually and technically difficult issue.
In the LMB approach, Jacobi–Synge actions are more relationally primary than Euler–Lagrange ones or equations of
motion, since the first are Leibniz-timeless whilst the last two are, from the relational perspective, in terms of a Machian
emergent time and thus not possibly relationally primary. Leibniz timelessness implies no primary notion of velocity and thus
that the usual canonical definition of momentum needs reformulating; I provide how to do this in terms of the Jacobi–Synge
line element. I gave further q and g compatibility requirements. I considered QM counterparts of the classical relational
implementation.
I then provided four expansions on Barbour’s ‘q is primary’: to phase space (or possibly some slightly weaker structure),
categorization, propositioning and perspecting. Whilst categorization might be argued for as a prerequisite to quantization,
I argued against this point of view in general; however, a more complicated version of categorization ends up underlying
propositioning and perspecting. I argued that the ideas of Isham, Doering and Butterfield concerning applying Topos Theory
to Quantum Theory are one possible implementation of perspecting. Finally, I showed how perspecting is how the LMB
relational approach makes contact with the Rovelli–Crane (RC) type of relational approach.
Moreover, there is tension between some parts of LMB and RC relationalism, since LMB takes Mach’s ‘time is to be
abstracted from change’ to involve all change, whilst Rovelli’s approach takes it to involve any change (which I term AMR
time: Aristotle–Mach–Rovelli). I argue then that it is better to hold to an intermediate interpretation: a sufficient totality of
locally relevant change, as judged at the level of which relative forces significantly affect the equations of motion, which I term
LMB-A time, is new to this article and is further elaborated upon in [94] (see Sec 22.1 for an outline). This covers further
detail of this approach, and how each of these three approaches leads to distinct attitudes to the theory of time-keeping and
to distinct timeless approaches to the Problem of Time in Quantum Gestalt.
22.1 Application 1) 3 interpretations of Mach’s ‘time is to be abstracted from change’
principle
Each of these three has a supporting argument. Rovelli’s interpretation applies generically (regardless of physical regime
or material composition of the system in question). On the other hand, LMB’s interpretation, by using the totality of the
change, produces an incontestable time, in that there is no more change elsewhere that can run in suspiciously irregular ways
that cause of one to doubt one’s timestandard. However, there is plenty of middle ground between these two positions.
Leibniz–Barbour’s statement of classical bestness implies the following more general notion.
[LBA] Some times are better than others.
Note 1) this holds without having to go to the whole-universe extreme, which is impractical, and operationally undesirable
– we know little of the motions and constitutions of very distant bodies. Also, since Leibniz’s day, the notion of ‘universe’
has gotten a whole lot more complicated with GR – were this taken seriously, does it refer to the Hubble radius or to the
actual entirely of the universe including unobservable portions? N.B. that this Leibniz–GR discrepancy in the nature of the
universe becomes a red herring in the below discussion.
Note 2) This also raises a partial objection to the Rovelli scheme, in that whilst Rovelli does not state he is looking for ‘good
clocks’, those are a fair notion to ask about, and yet clash conceptually with Rovelli-type notions that any time, or any clock,
will do. On the other hand, Barbour’s approach is very conducive toward asking and conceptually answering this question.
Note 3) in counterpoint, it might be argued that this is a question which in general has no answer, due to Rovelli’s genericity.
However, I propose a distinct LMB-A’ resolution to this issue below.
Relationalism 7M) Time is best in practise abstracted from a sufficient totality of locally relevant change.
This is ‘middling’ (M) between LMB Relationalism 7) and AMR Relationalism 7W); it conforms to what consists sufficiently
accurate timekeeping in practise.
In comparison to AMR, it has the extra element of acknowledging some times are locally more useful to consider than others.
Even in a generic situation, one can have a local ranking procedure for candidate times, alongside a refining procedure until
acceptable accuracy of predictability is obtained.
In comparison with LMB time, the practically-used ephemeris-type method for the solar system is entirely adequate without
having to consider the net physical effect (tidal effect) of distant massive bodies such as Andromeda (thus also rendering
irrelevant our increasing lack of precise knowledge of the masses and positions as one considers more and more distant
objects).
I refer to 6) and 7M) together as the LMB-A view of time.
7M) is built on the following wider view of Barbour and I.
MORE change is MORE reliable as a timestandard provider than less change.
Moreover, each of AMR, LMB and LMB-A entails a different attitude to timekeeping.
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AMR timekeeping: using any system as a clock, including very localized subsystems being taken to be able to work very
well as clocks in isolation from wider observations of change.
LMB timekeeping: the universe is only perfect clock.
LMB-A timekeeping: is like astronomers’ ephemeris actually was, or atomic clock timekeeping from the perspective
including recalibration by comparison with solar system dynamics. This more faithful representation of the astronomers’
actual procedure (such as ephemeris time or atomic time recalibrated in accord with solar-system physics) is why I take
inquiring in detail into what is meant by ‘universe’ in the LMB approach to be a red herring.
Relationalism 7M) is to be implemented by a Generalized Local Ephemeris Procedure. I.e., do not just use a change to
abstract a time, but also check whether using this time in the equations of motion for other changes suffices to predict these
to one’s desired accuracy. Further detail of this approach, and of how each of the above three approaches leads to distinct
attitudes to the theory of time-keeping and to distinct timeless approaches to the Problem of Time in QG with distinct
notions of emergent time is the subject of [94].
N.B. that the Relationalism 7 versus Relationalism 7W clash means that one cannot just add the RC postulates to the
LMB ones; Relationalism 7M then represents a compromise between these [and is also the most accurate encapsulation of
astronomical (based) timestandards].
22.2 Other applications
This article’s main applications are as follows.
Application 2) is the wider relational assessment of the Problem of Time’s facets and strategies. As regards Frozen Formalism
Problem resolving strategies, Leibniz-time, Mach-time and tangibility arguments hold against most Tempus ante Quantum
strategies (internal time, matter time...). On the other hand, emergent JBB time and the approximately equivalent emergent
semiclassical time comply with these criteria. Timeless and Histories Theory approaches generally do so too. Many other
Problem of Time facets have also been exposited as relational in this article. In particular, I have argued that the Thin
Sandwich Problem facet is generalized by, and relationally interpreted as, the Best Matching Problem, with other LMB-
relational ties being established to the Foliation Dependence Problem, Functional Evolution Problem, Problem of Beables
and Spacetime Reconstruction Problem. On the other hand, the Global and Multiple Choice Problems of time have been
found to have at least some ties to Rovelli’s approach to relationalism (which is also an alternative stance on the Problem of
Beables and the most sympathetic of the relational positions considered in this article as regards internal time and matter
time approaches).
Application 1)’s finer distinctions between the LMB, LMB-A, and AMR attitudes to Mach’s time principle serve as
further distinction between various timeless approaches and semiclassical-histories-timeless approach combinations, though
this is largely left to a subsequent article [94]. Application 6) below also concerns a way of enhancing Timeless Records
Theory/composites of at least Histories Theory and Records Theory.
Finally, this article’s more minimalist option of not considering (all) canonical transformations at least partly selects
against Internal Time, Histories Brackets, Ashtekar Variables and Linking Theory based approaches.
Application 3) concerns the status of scale in physical theories. Barbour argues against it, in good part due to its heterogeneity
as regards all the other degrees of freedom (the shapes). However, I argue that this heterogeneity can be used to obtain an
approximate timestandard based on the scale or some closely-related variable. Whilst this in itself does not comply with my
or Barbour’s interpretation of the Mach time principle, allowing the shape degrees of freedom to contribute perturbatively
to the more accurate form of resulting timestandard does comply thus. Moreover, this looks to be in particular an accurate
rendition of classical and quantum cosmology (due to the good fortune of anisotropies and inhomogeneities being much
smaller than scale effects in that setting).
Application 4) concerns further foundations for Ashtekar variables/LQG. Ashtekar variables/LQG are often stated to be
relational; more presicsely, that means Rovelli-relational. In the present article, however, I laid out how Ashtekar Variables
are also LMB(-A) relational. This is of foundational importance in widening the use of ‘relational’ to describe, motivate,
structure and further develop the Ashtekar variables/LQG program. I pointed out how RPM’s and geometrodynamics form
a natural sequence of theories of geometrical configurations, whilst regarding the Astekar bein variables as a momentum
is then somewhat incongruous. On the other hand, electromagnetism, Yang–Mills Theory and Ashtekar variables form a
rival natural sequence. I also pointed out that whilst LQG is a relational approach in all of this article’s senses, it does not
presently bear a relational name, (unlike geometrodynamics or shape dynamics, which are named for their configurationally
relational contents). I suggested Knot Quantum Gestalt, Quantum Nododynamics or Quantum Spin-Knot Dynamics (knots
being configurationally relational whilst loops include a Diff(3)’s worth of physical redundancy).
Application 5) is Relationalism versus Supersymmetry, which shall be continued in [96].
I emphasize that by the comments I provide in theis article on Ashtekar variables/LQG, supersymmetry, String Theory
and M-Theory, I demonstrate contact between LMB relationalism and much of modern Theoretical Physics.
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Application 6) concerns bringing together ID and timeless approaches (some of which also involve elements of RC relation-
alism). All of these areas of study principally concern subsystems. In the case of ID, this is via at least the great majority
of QM propositions that can be asked are about subsystems. ID has the broadest mathematization (Topos Theory), whilst
Crane uses categories. Records Theory does not conventionally make use of these structures, and yet ID’s development
supports Histories Theory (which contains, and shared many similarities with, Records Theory) and sheaves [167, 168] as a
means of locally attaching information may well provide an insightful new formulation for Records Theory.
There is however a chasm to bridge. In Records Theory, records are local in a metric space sense, whilst topoi and sheaves
have a structurally weaker topological space notion of locality. Thus one would need to extend/specialize (provide an extra
layer of structure) to ID’s work or consider the extent to which one can conceptualize with records using solely a topological
notion of locality.
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